Putin’s Rubicon
“Let us go where the gods have shown us the way and the injustice of our enemies calls us. Alea iacta est [a]”.1 With these words, Gaius Julius Caesar crossed the Rubicon, marking a decisive moment that would plunge the Roman Republic into civil war. Max Gallo, in his historical novel “César Imperator”, explores the life of Ceasar, detailing the events that led to the conflict between him and Pompey. As tensions escalated, the Proconsul remarked about Pompey: “We must force him to throw off the mask! I want to be on the side of the law until the last moment”.2
This thought process was encapsulated perfectly in the events leading to the conflict, with Ceasar strategically delaying action, waiting until the point of no return, despite mounting attacks and efforts to strip him of his powers3,4. By doing so, he positioned himself as being forced into conflict. This strategy allowed him to frame his actions as a reluctant yet necessary response to his opponents’ provocations.
This series of events parallels Russian President Vladimir Putin’s actions, which have been criticized as bluffs, unfulfilled threats or lacking the capability to be executed. These perceptions are further fueled by his repeated statements about the potential use of nuclear weapons and promises of Russian retaliation against Western interference in the Russo Ukrainian war, including the alleged Western involvement in planning the recent Ukrainian incursion into Kursk; a claim made by Russia which Washington has denied5.
Most recently Putin, speaking at the Plenary Session of the Eastern Economic Forum (EEF), warned Ukraine about their alleged attacks on nuclear powerplants in the Kursk Region as well as Zaporizhia, declaring “Those are very dangerous terrorist acts. One could only imagine what would happen if we responded in kind. What would happen to the whole part of Europe over there”.6 This most recent veiled threat, in a long line of hostile rhetoric used by Russia since the start of the war, can be construed in multiple ways. From a Western perspective, it would be tempting to interpret this as yet another in a series of threats uttered since the start of the war; rhetoric lacking substance by a leader who has failed to accomplish his set objectives for the war. It could also be interpreted as part of an escalating rhetoric that will eventually lead to action, plunging the world into global conflict, and a potential nuclear one at that. Just before Putin’s speech, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov warned the US about “mocking Russia’s red lines”7, a term Putin had previously used in April 2021 when discussing the situations of Belarus and Ukraine, as well as issues surrounding his now deceased critic, Alexei Navalny8.
And while Putin may have made several geopolitical blunders in recent years, he remains a shrewd politician, challenging the notion that his threats are merely empty words. At the risk of being seen as a Russia apologist, the current state of the Russo-Ukrainian war, including the recent incursion into Kursk is not entirely catastrophic for Russia. While this incursion did tarnish the image of the Russian President, the Russian Armed Forces took advantage of the weakened Ukrainian front to accelerate their advance in the Donbas Region. Although these gains may fall short of satisfying Russian nationalists, many of whom have been criticizing the conduct of the war9,10, the situation remains manageable for Putin, at least for the time being. However, it would be naïve to dismiss Russia’s preparedness for a nuclear scenario should the situation deteriorate further both on the front lines and domestically; hence the sustained “threatening” rhetoric from Putin and his allies without immediate consequences.
Just as Julius Ceasar allowed his opponents to act, remaining silent despite their numerous attempts to strip him of his powers since the death of Crassus at the battle of Carrhae in 53 BC4, Putin may be biding his time. Mirroring’s Ceasar’s strategy of appearing as a proponent of peace while portraying his enemies as aggressors, Putin employs a combination of conciliatory and threatening rhetoric, positioning himself as willing to negotiate yet ready to fight if necessary. Certainly, there exist discernible differences, as Ceasar was willing to compromise while Putin is in a situation where victory can only be attained by securing control of the Donbas while also preventing Ukraine form joining NATO. Despite appearances, Putin’s threats are not empty, as Russia has the means to initiate a nuclear conflict. The absence of such action thus far does not preclude its possibility. Rather, it suggests that Russia is waiting for an opportune moment, a perceived justification framed as a defensive response to Western actions. This parallels Ceasar’s war against the Republic as a necessary reaction to the Senate and the Optimates’ provocations. Similarly, Vladimir Putin seeks to frame the potential use of nuclear weapons as a compelled response to Western aggression, in line with his nuclear doctrine set in 2020, whereas “The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies, as well as in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation using conventional weapons, when the very existence of the state has been placed under threat”11.[b]
Ceasar’s crossing of the Rubicon was a point of no return, a decision that would lead to either his victory or defeat. This pivotal moment shaped history, leading the the eventual end of Res Publica[c], and paving the way for the inception of the principate two decades later. Vladimir Putin now finds himself in front of his own Rubicon. Pressure from nationalists, whose voices may grow louder, coupled with battlefield results could force Putin into a decisive action, compelling him to either resort to nuclear power or risk losing his position12; akin to Julius Ceasar’s crossing of the Rubicon, a moment where he would declare “alea iacta est”, marking a point of no return, opening a new chapter in contemporary history.
Bibliography
1. Suetonius, G. LIVES OF THE CAESARS. (Oxford University Press, 2000).
2. Gallo, M. César Imperator. (2003).
3. Appian. The Civil Wars. (Penguin Books, 1996).
4. Fezzi, L. Crossing the Rubicon: Caesar’s Decision and the Fate of Rome. (Yale University Press, 2019).
5. Faulconbridge, G. & Auyezov, O. Kremlin accuses the West of helping Ukraine attack Russia. Reuters https://www.reuters.com/world/kremlin-aide-says-nato-west-helped-ukraine-attack-russia-2024-08-16/ (2024).
6. RT. Putin warns Ukraine over ‘terrorist attacks’ on nuclear plants. RT https://swentr.site/russia/603549-putin-warns-ukraine-attacks-nuclear-plants/ (2024).
7. Antonov, D. & Trevelyan, M. Lavrov warns US not to mock Russia’s ‘red lines’. Reuters https://www.reuters.com/world/lavrov-warns-us-not-mock-russias-red-lines-2024-09-04/ (2024).
8. BBC. Putin warns of tough Russian action if West crosses ‘red line’. BBC https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56828813 (2021).
9. Osborn, A. Pro-war nationalist Putin critic Girkin charged with inciting extremism. Reuters https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-investigators-detain-pro-war-nationalist-putin-critic-igor-girkin-wife-2023-07-21/ (2023).
10. Murphy, M. Wagner, Prigozhin, Putin and Shoigu Bitter rivalries that led to a rebellion. Reuters https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66013532 (2023(
11. Trevelyan, M. What is Russia’s nuclear doctrine and how might it change? Reuters https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/what-is-russias-nuclear-doctrine-how-might-it-change-2024-09-02/ (2024).
12. Walid Youssef, M. (PhD). Putin’s Endgame: Coup or Nuclear Attack? ICGER https://en.icgers.com/index.php/2024/08/20/putins-endgamecoup-or-nuclear-attack/ (2024).
[a] The die is cast.
[b] While there have been discussions about potential changes to Russia’s nuclear doctrine since early September, no new updates have materialized. Therefore, the 2020 nuclear doctrine will be referenced in this article.
[c] The Roman Republic.