Fortifying Europe’s Shield: Towards Strategic Autonomy Amid Shifting U.S. Defense Policy
In his work, Epitoma Rei Militaris, Roman Author Publius Flavius Vegetius states the following: “Igitur quī dēsiderat pācem, praeparēt bellum”[a]; meaning “Therefore he who desires peace, let him prepare for war”. This maxim retains singular pertinence for contemporary Europe, as to secure statu quo and deter potential adversaries, a state must possess credible military capabilities. Indeed, amid shifting balances of power and intensifying regional tensions in the European continent, defense readiness is sine qua non. Following the US strategic pivot towards the Indo-Pacific1,2 under the new Trump Administration, Europe faces a critical choice. Either fortify its own defences for credible deterrence and strategic autonomy or risk falling even farther behind in the balance of power. Therefore, in order to meet emerging challenges in a shifting geopolitical environment, Europe must address both its technological and technical shortcomings, and rebuild its military capabilities, ensuring it can stand on equal footing with the military might of China and Russia. This urgency was echoed in March 20251 by EU commission president Ursula Von der Leyen, who underlined the necessity of fortifying European defence capabilities. And since, at present no single European country has the Ability to emerge as a single superpower, European states must prioritize collective defence, while simultaneously implementing systematic, gradual enhancements to their national defence capabilities.
Table 1: Comparison of military power between the US and the 7 Strongest US aligned European Military Powers (excluding Ukraine) according to Global Firepower’s Coalition Builder3.
According to Global Firepower’s 2025 Military Strength Ranking4, The 7 Strongest US aligned European Military Powers (excluding Ukraine) are the United Kingdom (UK), France, Italy, Germany, Spain, Poland and Sweden.
| Categories | United States of America | Top 7 Rated European Countries |
| Manpower | 2127500 | 2908762 |
| Airpower | 13043 | 4150 |
| Tanks | 4640 | 1976 |
| Armored Fighting Vehicles (AFVs) | 391963 | 348459 |
| Self-Propelled Guns (SPGs) | 671 | 1167 |
| Artillery | 1212 | 521 |
| Rocket Artillery | 641 | 288 |
| Navy | 440 | 1134 |
| Labor Force | 170549000 | 183204000 |
Since the end of the Second World War, Europeans countries have fallen significantly behind in terms of military power and capability, increasingly relying on the United States to provide a defensive umbrella against perceived threats5,6.
Table 1 provides a comparative analysis of the military capabilities between the US and the 7 strongest European military powers per Global Firepower4. The data reveals a pronounced capability Gap, as it takes all seven countries combined to marshal a military challenge to the US, yet they falls short in key areas such as Airpower, Tanks, AFVs and Artillery. None of the 7 countries can individually match the US Navy, with Sweden (308) and, unexpectedly, Italy (313) posting the closest power indices. According to Global Firepower, the United States holds a decisive advantage in primary naval assets, as it operates 11 aircraft carriers whereas the seven major European powers (excluding Ukraine) maintain collectively only six; one owned by France, two by Italy, one by Spain and two by the United Kingdom. Additionally, the US has the capability to field 70 submarines, compared to the European’s coalition’s combined total of 39, with no single European state from the sample owning 10 or more. In terms of destroyers, only France (11), Italy (3) and the UK (6) possess such vessels, for a cumulative total of 20 for the European coalition, significantly fewer than the 81 owned by the US (see Annex 1). In terms of Air Power, the United States maintains a substantial lead over the coalition, operating 13,043 aircraft compared to the coalition’s total of 4,150. Notably, none of the sampled of European states, has the capability to individually field 1,000 or more aircraft, with France possessing the largest Airforce European with 976 aircraft (see Annex 2).
During the 20th century, maritime and aerial power emerged as crucial factors of modern warfare, decisively shaping battlefield outcomes, and enabling global power projection. Historically, naval strength has been indispensable to achieving global dominance7,8, while military aviation grew in importance during the First World War, ultimately assuming a pivotal role by the Second World War9. During that conflict, the integration of naval and air capabilities became the spearhead of the military in the Pacific War between the US and Japan, showcasing the future of modern warfar10,11. Aircraft carrier–centric fleets redefined combat strategies, with the aircraft carrier evolving into the main offensive asset; launching a variety of aircraft from bombers to fighters and reconnaissance aircraft, thereby extending operational reach and creating a strategic paradigm shift in modern warfare, increasing the range and the ability to strike enemy targets using aerial power12.
Eighty years after the conclusion of the Second World War, the enduring importance of maritime and aerial power is more evident than ever. With areal superiority becoming one of the most important factors in modern warfare, the ability to deploy aircraft anywhere across the Globe via aircraft carriers confers significant strategic advantages that extends far beyond those of in-flight refueling alone. This advantage is uniquely embodied by the United states, which operates 11 aircraft carriers (see Annex 1) affording it unmatched global deployment capabilities. Moreover, assets such as submarines and destroyers further complement naval offensive projection and defensive capabilities, by enabling the launch of missiles against land targets, adversary vessels, and even military aircraft, thereby serving as both spear and shield in modern conflict. Additionally, nuclear capable submarines are equiped to launch nuclear ballistic missiles, further expanding nuclear deterrence, with only France and the UK possessing such submarines in Europe13. And while Ukraine’s recent strike on Russia’s Siberian military base housing nuclear-capable long-range bombers14 highlighted the growing importance of drone warfare, the strategic advantages provided by aircraft carrier-centric fleets and the air superiority achieved through modern fighter jets remain decisive factors in contemporary warfare.
The clear deficit in Europe’s aerial and naval combat capabilities as well as its lack of advancement in drone technology and warfare illustrates the weakening of its military might throughout the 20th century. And despite some national military success with fourth generation fighters, such as the French Rafale, the legacy Mirage 2000 from Dassault Aviation, as well as the Swedish Saab Grippen, and the multinational Eurofighter Typhoon (built by The UK, Germany, Italy and Spain), Europe still lacks a fifth-generation stealth-capable fighter aircraft, especially in light of the ongoing preliminary work on sixth-generation fighter development. As for armoured warfare, the German Leopard 2A7 is widely regarded as one of the most advanced tanks worldwide, even surpassing the US made M1 Abrams accord to some military experts. Meanwhile, France’s Leclerc tank remains competitive whereas the UK’s Challenger 2, despite its inherent capabilities, requires substantial modernisation to meet the demands of contemporary warfare. In contrast, Italy’s Ariete is generally assessed as less capable than its European counterparts15. Moreover, the top seven European military powers (excluding Ukraine) struggle to match US tank inventories in terms of numbers, which are almost 4 times greater. According to a recent report by Alexandr Burilkov and Guntram Wolff, Europe would need at least 300,000 additional troops and an annual defence budget increase of €250 billion ($272.65 billion) to match the US military capabilities16. Finally, Europe consists of distinct national entities with different policies and interests, complicating efforts to establish a unified military framework. Consequently, emphasis should be placed on strengthening national defence policies and fostering multilateral collaborative initiatives, to mitigate the technological and fiscal disparities between European states, the US and emerging global superpowers.
Europe stands at critical crossroads in its defence architecture, and mut act decisively to remain competitive in the current international environment. Should it pursue the formation of a fully integrated European Army, or instead focus on enhancing the interoperability of its existing national forces by organizing them into national brigades commanded by national officers, with strategic coordination provided by designated EU military staff ?
The Draghi report17 addresses one part of Europe’s defence dilemma, suggesting reduced reliance on US made weaponry, and recommending significant investment in the European defence industry; with an emphasis on standardizing equipment and training protocols to improve both intra-EU and European-NATO interoperability. While the ambition to completely standardize European weapon production currently seems idealistic, a more pragmatic alternative lies in reinforcing national defence industries through increased investments and deeper European cooperation. Such an approach would enhance Europe’s defence capabilities, thus pushing the old continent towards a more competitive military stance. Equally, despite the leveraging of the Russo-Ukrainian war and ipso facto the perceived Russian threat serving as a catalyst for the remilitarisation and rearmament of European states, the establishment of a unified European army seems a distant prospect. A European army is not only presently unrealistic, but it also challenges directly the very essence of the European nation-state identity, a concept that has been solidly entrenched since the Peace of Westphalia in 164818. Furthermore, it would also undermine the principles of state sovereignty and territorial integrity, tenets that the EU’s detractors often claim it is already eroding. Therefore, strengthening national armies while also fostering deeper cooperative frameworks may be the most viable solution. As such, senior military commanders from every participating nation would jointly elect or appoint a “supreme general” to serve as commander in chief of the multinational “coalition” army, enabling unified coordination and optimised deployment of military resources. Within this cooperative model, the backbone of Europe’s military might could be formed by key nations such as France with its Robust defence industry, the UK which, under the new Labor government, is prioritizing battle readiness and rejuvenating its defence sector19, Germany, which has signaled added military investment to bolster its position as Europe’s strongest military power20,21, and Poland, which is actively building one of the strongest military forces in Europe16,22. In Northern Europe, Finland and Sweden already demonstrate advanced military capabilities23,24 and possess the potential for further development. Among these nations, France and the UK possess the most battle-ready fleets (see Annex 1) with the potential to develop even more. Nevertheless, their current capabilities remain insufficient to establish a unified deterrent presence across European waters, or even project power globaly; especially when compared to the naval forces of the United States, China and Russia (see Annex 4). Additionally, while China may field a larger number of naval assets than the United States, the core strength of the US fleet, particularly its aircraft carrier capabilities, remains unmatched. Likewise, Russia largely contests US naval power through its extensive submarine fleet, which allows it to approach, though not equal the strength and strategic capabilities of the US navy (see Annex 3). These disparities underscore the imperative for Europe, as a collective, to enhance its naval deterrence in order to project power across Europeans seas and oceans; in the North Atlantic Ocean, North Sea, Norwegian Sea, Baltic Sea, Black Sea, and Mediterranean Sea. In this context, Spain and Portugal must revitalize and reconstruct their historic and once great armadas, while Sweden, Finland, Norway and Denmark are expected to assume pivotal roles in safeguarding the Northern and Baltic Seas.
Moreover, enhancing Europe’s internal military mobility through improved transportation infrastructure is essential. Drawing inspiration from historical precedents such as Rome’s construction of the Via Appia during the Samnite wars, which was essential to the rapid deployment of troops, modern European defence strategy must prioritize efficient logistical networks to ensure swift military response and effective troop transportation across the continent.
To address its technological and economic limitations, Europe must intensify its commitment to multinational defense projects, such as the Franco-German Main Ground Combat System (MGCS), a collaboration between four major European defense firms; KNDS Deutschland, KNDS France, Rheinmetall Landsysteme and Thales25,26, as well as the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) led by France, Germany, and Spain. The latter project aims to develop a sixth-generation stealth fighter jet supported by unmanned aerial vehicles (remote carriers) and integrated into an AI-powered combat cloud, to enable seamless data sharing and coordination; with key contributions from Dassault Aviation, Airbus, Indra Sistemas, Thales, MBDA,MTU Aero Engines among others27. Another joint effort program is the Global Combat Air Program (GCAP), a collaborative initiative between the UK, Italy and Japan; involving BAE Systems, Leonardo, and Japan’s Aircraft Industrial Enhancement (JAIEC)28. However, the presence of two distinct stealth jet initiatives reveals a significant challenge within European defense collaboration. This strategy undermines potential cost-efficiency and operational synergies that could be attained through a more cohesive approach, as each of the projects[b] incurs significant costs on its own. Furthermore, even though competition drives innovation, Europe cannot afford to pursue dispersed initiatives at this time. Indeed, although Dassault Aviation and Saab have successfully developed highly effective fourth generation jets, the substantial costs and resource demands of developing a new-generation aircraft render collaboration indispensable to remain competitive.
Ideally, the European Union should shift away from imposing uniform policies that infringe on national sovereignty thereby reducing internal friction. Embracing the cultural diversity of its member states, and prioritizing economic, scientific and military collaboration, the EU could evolve into a fully integrated economic and military bloc. Such a transformation would not only enable Europe to consolidate its defensive capabilities but also establish a robust framework focused on maintaining peace through effective deterrence. By reducing Europe’s dependence on US security guarantees, this strategic shift would promote a more independent defense posture free from the need to adhere to US policy directives.
Lastly, war preparation must not come at the expense of domestic stability. European governments must sustain robust economies and social welfare systems to maintain public satisfaction and prevent civil instability. Economic hardships along with a heightened military focus are likely to generate discontent and societal unease. While it is important to maintain a credible defense posture, it is also imperative to foster an environment of peace, where citizens can pursue scientific advancement and social progress without the immediate fear of armed conflict, yet remain prepared to defend national borders if required. In this regard, Switzerland’s model of Armed Neutrality offers a perfect example. The Helvetian country has upheld neutrality since the 16th century29, and not engaged in armed conflict since 181529, while maintaining military readiness against any potential threat.
This article does not, under any circumstances, advocate belligerence. Rather, it emphasizes the imperative for Europe to advance both scientifically and militarily, with armed conflict remaining a measure of last resort. In a global environment marked by shifting power dynamics and mounting geopolitical tensions, the old continent must prioritize the development of credible military capabilities to maintain strategic relevance.
Europe should consequently adopt more pragmatic approaches and move away from sentimental and ideologically rigid foreign policy frameworks. Indeed, European nations find themselves at crossroads, as the US redirects its focus eastward, and the Russo-Ukrainian war continues to threaten stability in the region. Europe must therefore bridge its technological and military gaps, harnessing collective military programs to secure peace by preparing for war. Such efforts must be accompanied by astute diplomacy, using deterrence as a tool to preserve peace, not as justification for enforcing erratic and provocative policies.
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Source: Global Firepower Annex 1: Key Naval Assets of the US and Its Strongest European Allies (Excluding Ukraine) Annex
| Source: Global Firepower |
| Annex 2: Comparative Analysis of US and Leading European Allies’ Military Aircraft Totals (Excluding Ukraine) |
| Annex 3: Comparative analysis of the main military naval assets of the US, China and Russia |
| Annex 4: comparative analysis of the total naval assets of the United States, China, Russia, and the seven strongest U.S.–aligned European military powers (excluding Ukraine). |
[a] Also knows in a simplified version as “Si vis pacem, para bellum”
[b] In this case we are talking about the FCAS and CGAP projects