Operation Spiderweb: Putin’s Snake in the Grass

Operation Spiderweb: Putin’s Snake in the Grass
A great deal of analysts have attempted to interpret the Ukrainian drone strike deep inside Russian territory on June 1, 2025. Some have drawn a parallel between this operation and Japan’s attack on American military bases at Pearl Harbor in December 1941, which forced the United States to intervene in World War II. Others have likened it to Israel’s “Operation Grim Beeper,” targeting Hezbollah’s radio systems in September 2024, which, they argue, marked the beginning of Hezbollah’s defeat.
However, neither analogy holds. In the first case, even if Japan was not a superior power to the United States at that moment in global history, it was at least its strategic and objective equal. Therefore, “Operation Spiderweb” cannot reasonably be compared to Pearl Harbor.
The second comparison again fails: Israel is clearly the superior force, whereas Hezbollah, despite its supposed power, is a non-state actor confronting a far superior state force. Thus, the analogy does not hold in that scenario either.
A more fitting historical analogy for “Operation Spiderweb” is the al-Qaeda’s attack on the United States on September 11, 2001, when the strikes against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon took place.
We must, therefore, examine what consequences may follow this operation and whether their consequences migh mimic the aftermath of the September 11 attacks.
Needless to say, we are not likening Ukraine to al-Qaeda; Ukraine is a fully sovereign state, whereas al-Qaeda is a global terrorist jihadist organization. The basis of the comparison lies in the fact that both targeted two major nuclear powers in the heart of their respective homelands.
The interpretation of “Operation Spiderweb” operation through both classical and quantum analytical lenses, following our school of political analysis:
• Facts:
The Ukrainian strikes targeted four airbases deep inside Russia, the furthest being the Belaya Airbase in the Irkutsk region, approximately 4,500 kilometers from the Ukrainian-Russian border. Other targets included Olenya Airbase near Murmansk in the Arctic Circle, over 2,000 kilometers away; Dyagilevo Airbase in Ryazan, about 520 kilometers from Ukraine; and Ivanovo Airbase, a hub for Russian military transport aircraft roughly 800 kilometers from the border.
Russia’s Ministry of Defense confirmed the attacks, describing them as “terrorist acts” launched from the vicinity of its airfields. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that 117 drones were deployed in the operation, which caused an estimated $7 billion in damage and struck 34% of Russia’s strategic cruise missile carriers at their primary airbases, according to Ukrainian intelligence. The losses were detailed by NBC as follows:
“Oliver Alexander, a Danish open-source intelligence analyst, told NBC News that the publicly available evidence best supports this version of events […]. The satellite images and SBU video show 12 aircraft “completely destroyed” and another 10 “hit” by the drones, according to Alexander. […] Satellite imagery from Planet Labs and Maxar taken 2,500 miles away from Ukraine, in Russia’s Irkutsk oblast, on June 5, four days after the attack, showed six aircraft at Belaya airfield that were completely destroyed in the Ukrainian attack. […] Three were Tupolev Tu-95 strategic bombers, and three Tupolev Tu-22 supersonic bombers, all of which have been used to launch missiles at Ukraine. […] The images confirm that at least two were Tu-95s and another was a Tu-22. Social media video geolocated by NBC News to Olenya air base shows a man dressed in military fatigues filming a wall of flames also around a Tu-95 bomber.”[i]
At the start of the year, Russia had 55 Tu-22M3s and 57 Tu-95s in its fleet, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ Military Balance 2025 report.[ii] The Tu-95, which joined the Soviet Air Force in the 1950s, has been modified by Russia to carry cruise missiles such as the TU-22.
• Classical Analysis and Consequences
From a classical standpoint, this Ukrainian attack on Russia would demand a blistering Russian military campaign in retaliation employing Kalibr/NK (3M-54) missiles, which resemble U.S. Tomahawk cruise missiles, launched from ships and submarines in the Caspian Sea, as well as Iskander-M and Iskander-SS missiles, in addition to the Oryshnik system and the Avangard and Kinzhal hypersonic systems. Strategic bombers TU-160 and TU-95 would also be deployed to demonstrate that Russia’s strategic deterrence capabilities remain intact, to reassure the Russian public, and to preserve the military’s image of strength before both allies and adversaries.
The classical analysis further suggests that a Russian military response must be overwhelming (whether conventional or tactical-nuclear), destroying Ukrainian command-and-control centers, military headquarters, the Ministry of Defense, the presidential compound, and military intelligence (the very entity behind the operation), finally leading to regime change. This would mirror what the U.S. did in Afghanistan at the end of 2001 when it launched a full-scale campaign against the Taliban and removed it from power.
Such a geopolitical transformation would drastically shift the balance of power in Europe.
Anything less would jeopardize the historical military prestige of the Russian army and the credibility of its intelligence apparatus. It could set a dangerous precedent for Ukraine to dare strike at Russia’s strategic nuclear forces again. It would also embolden Moscow’s adversaries and raise serious doubts among Putin’s allies in China, North Korea, Iran, and Belarus, who may begin to question the competence of Russia’s military and intelligence institutions. European states may then seek to prolong the war and further drain Russia’s resources. Finally, it could energize a faction within Donald Trump’s administration to resume arms, technology, and intelligence supply for Ukraine should Putin be seen as inflexible in peace negotiations.
One might ask: why did Russia fail to conceal its strategic bombers, leaving them exposed without air defense systems? The answer lies in the expiration of the New START Treaty and the Open Skies Treaty, which lifted previous obligations on Russia to avoid concealing its strategic bombers in designated shelters. Russia had simply assumed Ukraine was incapable of such long-range strikes due to geographical limitations. But, indeed, this was Russia’s snake in the grass.
• Quantum Analysis
Given that classical analysis has struggled to account for the dynamics of this war since its outset, quantum analysis may offer a broader interpretive scope.
As the quantum framework encompasses all plausible outcomes, one possibility is that the “Operation Spiderweb” may prompt Russian leadership to enter serious negotiations with Ukraine to resolve a crisis that has persisted since 1992.
Another possibility within quantum analysis is the convergence of internal forces leading to a coup against President Putin, for example, by a coalition of military generals, Russian nationalist theorists, select oligarchs, and influential figures within the Orthodox Church, all driven by patriotic fervor and nationalistic zeal to restore Russia’s historical prestige.
It is worth recalling that after pursuing Napoleon’s army from Moscow to the gates of Paris and the 1815 Battle of Waterloo, the Russian army was hailed as Europe’s savior. Tsar Alexander I was the dominant force at the Congress of Vienna, convened by Austrian Foreign Minister Klemens von Metternich.
It would indeed be bitter for the Russian leadership to witness their state and army decline to such a level of incapacity. Putin now stands at a crossroads: either the classical route of overwhelming force and regime change in Ukraine or two quantum possibilities: a historic peace treaty or a revolutionary military coup.
[i] https://www.nbcnews.com/world/ukraine/ukraine-spiderweb-drone-attack-russia-kyiv-moscow-osint-satellite-rcna211381
[ii] https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance/ ; Report available on: https://www.routledge.com/The-Military-Balance-2025/forStrategicStudiesIISS/p/book/9781041049678