Echoes of History: Ibn Taymiyyah’s Fatwas and Syria’s Sectarian Inferno
§O you who have believed, be persistently standing firm for Allah, witnesses in justice, and do not let the hatred of a people prevent you from being just. Be just; that is nearer to righteousness. And fear Allah; indeed, Allah is Acquainted with what you do.[…]§ (Quran 5:8)
Our scientifically grounded approach to politics guides us toward neutrality, objectivity, and fairness—much like a physicist impartially observing natural phenomena. We will neither flatter nor deceive nor make false accusations. This article will reveal and discuss unspoken truths about Syria, addressing Syrians and non-Syrians alike.
Perhaps the Salafi doctrinal authority from which Jabhat al-Nusra (Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham) and its affiliated Sunni Islamist factions and groups derive their legitimacy are the frequently invoked statements and fatwas of Taqī al-Dīn Abu al-ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728 AH), who advocated the takfīr (excommunication) of Rāfiḍah (Shīʿa), Nuṣayrīs (ʿAlawīs), Druze, and others—mandates that they wage war against all segments of Syrian society, except the Sunni community. The offensive launched by these factions against the ‘Alawite mountains since March 6, 2025, embodies the widely circulated fatwas found in Ibn Taymiyyah’s writings, particularly his Majmūʿ al-Fatāwā, in which he explicitly called for dispersing the Nuṣayrīs of the Syrian mountains among Muslim lands. Ibn Taymiyyah became the earliest theorist of religious and sectarian cleansing despite failing to implement his ruling at the time—even though he personally led a campaign against them with an army provided by the Mamluk Sultan al-Afram. Internal disputes with other Mamluk factions in Egypt prevented the realization of his fatwa, only for Sunni armed factions to seek its implementation today, more than seven centuries later.
Thus, the region returns to the state it had known 1400 years ago, echoing periods of conflict such as those witnessed during the Umayyad–Abbasid rivalry, as well as during the eras of the Buyids, Hamdanids, Qarmatians, Fatimids, Seljuks, Ayyubids, Mamluks, and ultimately the Ottomans and Safavids. Historically, the norm and the foundational reality of this region had always been conflict and continuous warfare, interrupted only by a period of stability ushered in by the emergence of nation-states following the Sykes-Picot-Sazonov agreement, the subsequent foreign mandates established by the Treaty of Versailles, the League of Nations mandates, and finally the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. During this era, nascent nation-states allowed temporary peace, stability, and prosperity. However, after the withdrawal of the mandates, military coups emerged, nationalist parties rose to power, and ultimately, Sunni and Shi‘i Islamist movements gained prominence. History thus completed another cycle, reverting once again to the original pattern of conflict and warfare that characterized much of Islamic history.
Therefore, the events unfolding since March 6, 2025, constitute a strictly sectarian conflict rooted explicitly in the religious identities and affiliations of the combatants. Sunni fighters battle Alawite fighters, with Sunnis broadly supporting their own combatants, as evidenced by calls from mosques in Aleppo, Idlib, Hama, Damascus, Azaz, Mare’, Jisr al-Shughur, and other Sunni-majority cities, echoing slogans such as: “Hasten to jihad,” “Mount up, O steeds of Allah,” “Come forth, O breeze of Paradise,” and “O Allah’s raid!”—all slogans characteristic of Salafi-jihadi discourse. Conversely, calls emerging from neighborhoods, countryside, and villages in Latakia, Tartus, and Homs invoke the phrase “Ya ‘Ali,” clearly associated with the Alawite sect’s historical religious heritage. Such observations demonstrate that events in Syria since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 represent a Sunni-Alawite sectarian war rather than mere political actions by the new authorities against the remnants of the former regime – regardless of whether followers of the old regime initiated these events or were drawn into them by the new authorities.
The former Syrian regime’s army has disintegrated into factions and armed groups led by former officers who have become warlords and militia commanders. Meanwhile, opposition Islamic factions and groups failed to unify under the single army that Syria’s new authorities claimed to have established. Instead, these groups remained unchanged, each led by their original commanders, even if they donned army uniforms or were conferred military ranks by the new regime. Thus, both sides share the same nature: factions and militias engaged in mutual conflict without significant differences.
The ongoing conflict in Syria is, therefore, between armed factions and divided militias on both sides alike, rather than—as some claim—between an official current army and remnants of the former regime. This situation arose precisely because supporters of the former regime predominantly belong to one specific sectarian identity (the ‘Alawite community), while members of the purported “new army” belong exclusively to another (the Sunni community), especially as Kurds, Druze, and Christians refused to join this newly established army. Consequently, today’s loyalist groups remain separate Islamic militias and factions, and as such, they cannot be adequately designated an army.
The former Assad regime committed war crimes and crimes against humanity, such as the chemical weapons attack on Ghouta in 2013, most likely using Sarin or a similar weapons-grade nerve agent, resulting in the deaths of women, children, and men, the sieges of eastern Aleppo, Zabadani, rural Damascus, and certain areas in Homs, and the use of Sukhoi and MiG fighter jets, Scud-D missiles, and indiscriminate barrel bombs dropped on residential areas since 2013. The new Al-Shara‘ authorities have undertaken similar actions whenever they could obtain new weapons successfully, and they found the pretexts to use them. The crimes of the former regime might be more evident due to its possession of sophisticated weaponry; however, the intentions and actions of the new authorities and armed Islamist groups are equally clear: they demonstrate the willingness to employ any weapons they can acquire. Their abstention from using the weaponry employed by the Assad regime is not the result of moral restraint or principled commitment to lawfulness but of their inability to obtain such weapons. Once capable, they will readily commit war crimes and crimes against humanity – indiscriminately targeting ‘Alawite fighters and civilians alike. Media outlets and social media platforms are replete with undeniable graphic photos and videos demonstrating that the actions, intentions, and resolve of Sunni Islamist groups in Syria are to exterminate Alawites, seize or destroy property, enslave women, and violate the sect’s dignity, and they are comparable to the crimes committed by the Assad security forces, the Fourth Division, and the shabiha of the former regime.
Indeed, certain video clips documenting events in the Qusur district of Baniyas on Friday, March 7, 2025, as well as in Mukhtariya village, Jableh, and elsewhere, clearly reveal that even the lesser crimes perpetrated by Sunni armed groups exceed in atrocity and gruesomeness the major crimes committed by Assad’s former regime. How, then, can one describe the magnitude of these groups’ greater crimes?
The sight of Sunni armed groups parading young ‘Alawite men almost naked in Baniyas on March 7, 2025, forcing them to imitate barking dogs before executing them, surpasses in brutality even ISIS’s parading of Iraqi soldiers from the Speicher military base near Tikrit in June 2014 before killing them. ISIS refrained, at least, from forcing their victims to bark or crawl on their hands and feet.[i]
Just as the Assad regime had its propaganda mouthpieces, television channels, media networks, and online bots that justified all crimes, the current authorities and their allied armed groups possess even more numerous propagandists and sycophants. Astonishingly, former regime propagandists have seamlessly become mouthpieces for the current authority, repeating exactly the same behavior they practiced previously. Certain television channels and media networks—once regarded by political observers as somewhat objective and trustworthy—have now willingly engaged in promoting the narratives of the new authorities in Syria, distorting facts and events against all professionalism, impartiality, and objective reporting. These outlets have falsely labeled and presented ‘Alawite civilians—including women, children, the elderly, and innocent people—as mere “remnants” of the Assad regime, thereby exonerating Sunni armed groups in Syria from responsibility for war crimes and genocide in advance. They mirror the role played by pro-Assad media since the crisis began, covering up and justifying the regime’s atrocities. Thus, there is no fundamental difference between the networks and propagandists of both sides: each has equally indulged in justifying atrocities and rationalizing killing. Such abhorrent crimes can never be justified under any circumstance, regardless of the religious or ethnic affiliation of innocent civilians.
The general mobilization and advance of thousands of Sunni faction fighters and armed groups from Aleppo and its countryside, Idlib and its countryside, Hama, Damascus, and even Deir ez-Zor into ‘Alawite regions in Syria are not without serious implications. These events suggest two possibilities:
- If the new Syrian authorities ordered or approved these actions, it would represent a profound breach of their stated commitments toward establishing the rule of law, protecting freedoms and fundamental rights, and honoring the promises they had made to Arab and foreign officials who visited Damascus during this period, or those assurances they gave abroad. Such acts would reveal their promises as mere taqiyya.[ii]
- Alternatively, if the new authorities neither ordered nor approved of these events, it indicates severe weakness, proving they are incapable and unfit to govern Syria, although that would absolve them of direct responsibility. However, if they had no prior knowledge and later sanctioned these actions, they would be part of the crime and bear equal moral responsibility alongside the armed factions carrying out the indiscriminate killings.
An undeniable reality that many hesitate to acknowledge, but which the truth and my knowledge and understanding of the political doctrines of these Islamist groups compel me to state openly, is that Syria faces imminent sectarian warfare involving Kurds, Druze, and Christians alike. Jabhat al-Nusra (Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham) explicitly seeks to establish an Islamic state in Syria, complete with its traditional political rulings (al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah) and religious jurisdictions (Wilāyāt Dīniyyah), inevitably pushing the country toward religious, sectarian, and ethnic wars that will, sooner or later, culminate in Syria’s partition.
The optimal geopolitical solution to prevent further bloodshed resulting from this sectarian war is the geopolitical partition of Syria—contrary to my personal wishes, which lean toward a unified Syria under a secular state founded on the principles of civic citizenship. Yet, realistically, the region is heading toward religious, sectarian, and ethnic conflicts that could claim millions of innocent lives. Therefore, convening a new Treaty of Sèvres to grant each ethnic and religious group in Syria and the broader Middle East the right to self-determination through peaceful negotiations would be far preferable to an inevitable violent geopolitical restructuring, which threatens immense human suffering.
However, many will oppose such a solution, most notably by Turkey. Turkey will actively resist any attempt to alter the current reality in Syria, instigating tensions and conflicts. It will brawl with Arab countries since its position diverges sharply from theirs, and their interests are in conflict. Disagreements with Arab states will likely escalate, and regional deterrence forces may possibly be deployed to contain the conflict before international powers intervene. Consequently, the interests of various parties will intersect, diverge, and realign, drawing in the United States, Russia, China, Europe, Iran, Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the UAE, and Jordan. Meetings of the UN Security Council and regional conferences will convene, each reflecting competing national interests.
Turkey’s actions will contribute to igniting a larger Sunni–Shi‘i sectarian war, reshaping the region alongside Syria’s conflict. This escalation will culminate in a geopolitical reengineering of the broader Middle East, especially as existing states fragment, international borders shift, and new nations emerge.
Nothing stated above should be understood as an incitement to religious, ethnic, sectarian, or any other form of conflict. Rather, it is an objective and impartial documentation of political realities in line with our analytical methodology. We stress that, despite these realities, we still advocate for establishing a secular national state in a unified Syria founded on equal citizenship.
[i] Likening humans to dogs is a great insult and dehumanization in Arab culture and Islam – dogs are conventionally thought of as ritually impure. This idea taps into a long tradition that considers even the mere sight of a dog during prayer to have the power to nullify a pious Muslim’s supplications.
[ii] Taqiyyah, in Islam, the practice of concealing one’s belief and foregoing ordinary religious duties when under threat of death or injury.