An Archaeology of the Rise of Takfir in Islamic History

*See end of article for a glossary of terms

Attacks with explosives and intra-Muslim killings have dramatically increased without condemnation. They became so normalized that a suicide attack or driving a car packed with explosives into a mosque, a public market, a school, a university, or a hospital does not garner attention or care, even when it kills tens or hundreds of Muslim civilians.

Hundreds of worshippers died in the Al Rawda mosque in Sinai, Egypt, in 2007, and others in the schools, universities, and mosques in Balochistan, Waziristan, Peshawar in Pakistan; in Kabul, Jalalabad, and Kandahar in Afghanistan; in A’zamiyah and Al-Karkh in Baghdad in Iraq; similarly in Nigeria, Syria, and other locations in the Muslim world.

I was personally petrified by the killing of more than 50 worshippers in the Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces in Pakistan on September 29, 2023, without any condemnation on the part of Muslims. It is as though Muslims took to the takfir of other Muslims by Al-Qaeda, An-Nusra, the Islamic State, Boko Haram, Taliban, and others, and their fatwas to legitimize killing them.

This deafening silence about the wave of takfir spreading within Muslim groups will have truly detrimental consequences in the coming years when these groups will have bolstered their power in the Sahara Desert, seized the coastal and Sahara countries in Africa such as Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Sudan, Chad, and Libya, leaped into Tunisia and Algeria, metastasizing in Syria and Iraw again, and proliferating in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Eastern Asia and until Indonesia.

I believe it is my ethical duty to warn the governments of Islamic countries and governments of the world so they can protect their people and resources from the dangers looming on their horizon as the consequences of the spread of the phenomenon of takfir. It is essential to campaign against it intently, exposing its roots, origins, and the environment in which it thrived. To this end, I conducted a deep intellectual and historical archaeology of the phenomenon of takfir, revealing its development since its inception. This will lay the foundations for a comprehensive understanding of this phenomenon, paving the way for a solution and saving people the pain and suffering it will undoubtedly cause.

An archaeology of the history of the phenomenon of Muslim takfir shows that it appeared in the second half of the second Hijri century. Observers could not find evidence of Muslims excommunicating other Muslims during the first Hijri century and the first half of the second Hijri, despite most epic bloodshed and strife between Muslims having happened in that period.

They spilled rivers of blood, wielding swords against each other and gathering their strengths to demand power and rule over each other. They fought hundreds of major wars and thousands of smaller-scale battles that claimed the lives of 2 million Muslims after the death of the Prophet and until 170 AH. However, no one group excommunicated the other until the second half of the second Hijri century.

The first violent turbulence took place between ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib, al-Zubayr bin al-‘Awwam, Talha ibn ‘Ubaidullah, and ‘Aisha Mother of the Believers, on the day of the Battle of the Camel, 36AH, followed by the Battle of Siffin in 37AH between ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib and Mu’awiya ibn Abi Sufyan. 100,000 Muslims were killed in these battles, but the warring parties did not excommunicate each other. In Tarikh Al Islam, Al-Hafiz Al-Dhahabi states: “From Al-Suddiy: With ‘Ali stood 130 Badriy, of which 30,000 were killed.”[i] Al-Dhahabi also stated: “From Ibn Sirin: 70,000 were killed on the day of Siffin, counted by spikes.”[ii] Each party drew swords against the other and fought, but none excommunicated the other.

Strife between Muslims followed in the first century A.H., the first half of the second century, and until the second half of the second century A.H. Two million Muslims were killed during that period without excommunication, except for Al-Khawarij. The first Muhakkima did not resort to excommunicating other Muslims, nor did the Ibadiyya, the followers of Abdullah bin Ibad. Despite the Khawarij being the most ardent fighters against Islam, the most bloodthirsty, and the fastest to resort to violence in their disputes with Ahlul Qibla, they abstained from excommunicating them, except for Al Azaariqa, followers of Nafi’ bin Al Azraq, and the Al Suffariya, followers of Ziad bin Al Asfar who excommunicated them based on kufr an-ni’ma (kufr in the blessings one received) not kufr ash-shirk (worshipping deities other than God). Evidence of this abounds in the books of their greatest historians, such as Al-Yaman bin al-Rabab from Najdat, followers of Najda bin ‘Amir Al-Hanafi, Muhammad bin Harb, Yahya bin Kamil, and Abdullah bin Yazid al-Ibadi.

Abu Hassan al-Ash‘ari also stated about the Khawarij: “They all said: every sin is kufr ni‘ma, not kufr shirk.”[iii] Mus‘ab bin al-Zubayr killed Al-Mukhtar bin Abi ‘Ubayd in 67AH in Kufa without excommunicating him, although the latter held the pretense that he was a prophet among his entourage, the reason why he was called “Mukhtar the liar.”

In 80AH, Abdurrahman bin Muhammad bin al-Ash‘ath bin Qays al-Kindi rebelled against Al Hajjaj bin Yusuf al-Thiqi and Abdul Malik bin Marwan, after which he deposed Abdul Malik. Of the events that occurred between them, Al Hafiz ad-Dhahabi says: “Many battles [occurred]—the Battle of Dujail, the Battle of Dayr al-Jamajim,  and the Battle of Ahwaz. Ibn al-Ash‘ath was accompanied by 33,000 cavaliers and 120,000 infantrymen, including scholars, righteous men, and fiqh experts who willfully fought Al-Hajjaj. It is said they fought 84 battles in 100 days.”[iv]

Tens of thousands were killed between both parties in this major strife that lasted three years. Neither party excommunicated the other. Instead, their battles were instigated by betrayals, deposing rulers, and seeking power and authority.

“Abdul Malik bin-Marwan crucified Ma‘bad al-Juhani for denouncing al-qadr.”[v] He was executed by an order and not accused of kufr in 80 A.H.

In 79 AH, Abdul Malik bin Marwan killed Al Harith bin Sa‘id, nicknamed The Liar, for claiming to be a prophet, infatuating people. “He showed the miracles. He goes to a marble pillar in the mosque and taps it with his hand, and it praises God. He fed them summer fruits in the winter and told them: ‘Come out so I show you the angels.’ They would come out to Dayr Mran, where he shows them men on horseback.”[vi] Abdul Malik bin Marwan crucified him as a sentence for trespassing laws. The punishment for blasphemy is not crucifixion; it is the decapitation of kafir.

Abdul Malik bin Marwan crucified Ma‘bad al-Juhani and Harith bin Sa‘id al Kathab, while bin knowledgeable in the matters of sentencing and Shari‘a law. He was one of 400 Imams in Medina alongside Sa‘id bin al-Musib, ‘Urwa bin al-Zubayr, and Qubaysa bin Zu’aib.

Major scholars discussed Ma‘bad al-Juhani: “Narrations about him [Al Juhani] by Qutada, Malik bin Dinar, ‘Of al-A‘rabi, and Sa‘d bin Ibrahim, collected by Ibn Mu‘in, and told by Abu Hatim [described him as] ‘truthful to his word.”[vii] Had al-Juhani been executed for blasphemy, Yahya bin Mu‘in would not have documented him, Abu Hatim would not have judged him to be honest, and Qutada and others would have abstained from narrating about him.

This shows clear evidence to the widespread killing and bloodshed caused by politics or difference in opinions, without accusations of blasphemy. Back then, no one dared accuse Muslims of blasphemy.

Khalid ibn Abdallah al-Qasri executed Al Mughayra bin Said al-Bajali al-Kufi, under the pretense that he claimed to be a prophet and that people followed him because he showed them unfamiliar miracles. It was narrated that “Al Shu‘bi said to al-Mughayra bin Sa‘id what did the love of Ali do, he said: in the bones, the flesh, and the veins.”[viii] Al-Imam al-Shu‘bi refused to excommunicate al-Mughayra, but he warned him from being killed, and he cautioned him about his extreme love for Ali bin Abi Talib and what the love of Ali brought upon those who professed it during the rule of the Umayyads. Al-Mughayra was executed by Khalid bin Abdullah Al Qasri, the appointee of Hisham bin ‘Abdul Malik in Iraq.

These conditions endured along with the widespread killings during the Umayyad rule’s decline and the Abbasids’ expansion. Abi Muslim al-Khurasani led major wars against the Umayyad rulers in Khurasan. He fought Nasr ibn Sayyar and defeated him, seizing El Rey and Marw. He then killed Ali bin Jadi‘ al-Karmani. Ad-Dhahabi mentioned that he found, “in the handwriting of our companion, ibn Jama‘a al-Kanani, that he saw, in the handwriting of if Ibn Salah: They counted two thousand thousands killed by Abu Muslim.”[ix] This amounts to two million victims, all Muslims. Schasms and strife spread to all Muslim lands with the rise of the Abbasids against the Umayyads and with al-Khawarij leading wars and military campaigns against Muslims. These battles, civil wars, and the second major strife between 128 AH and 132 AH left behind them 3 million Muslim victims. The purpose of expanding on these events in this study is to show that Muslims fought each other, spilling the blood of millions, without excommunicating each other until the second half of the second Hijri century.

Abu Ja‘far al-Mansur crucified Muhammad bin Sa‘idbin Hassan, a hadith narrator, narrated by Al-Tirmidhi in his sunna, narrated by Makhul and Al-Zahri, narrated by Abu Mu‘awiya al-Dharir student of Al A‘mash, narrated by Al Muharibi one of the sheikhs of Ahmad bin Hanbal, and mentioned by ad-Dhahabi in his History: “Al Thawri entered [the abode of] Muhammad bin Sa‘id and stayed for an hour, then exited and said: he is a liar.”[x] Sufyan Al Thawri only called him a liar without going further and accusing him of blasphemy, despite this happening toward the end of the era of moderation and the start of the era of takfir. Muhammad bin Sa‘id was crucified in 150 AH. Ahmad bin Hanbal and others purported that he was crucified for heresy. Al Mansur was known for executing based on accusation, suspicion, and conjecture.

An archaeology of the phenomenon of takfir among Muslims demonstrates that moderation and abstaining from excommunicating other Muslims for reasons of a difference in opinion or belief was the norm until the death of the last of the class of moderate Imams and narrators like Shi‘ba (160 AH), Al-Uza‘I (157 AH), Sa‘id ibn abi ‘Uruba (156 AH), Isra’il bin abi Ishaaq (162 AH), Sufyan al-Thawri (161 AH), and Hamad bin Sulma (167 AH).

With the extinction of this class of scholars, religious moderation and centrism, common since the era of Sahaba, started disappearing to the benefit of extremism. This is when Muslims started excommunicating each other, which became engrained in the culture through generations and new classes of narrators and faqihs. It became a deeply rooted ideology since the era of the Asha‘ira. Muslims cannot end the phenomenon of takfir unless they revert to the moderation and centrism that ruled during the first Hijri century and until the second half of the second Hijri century, denounce the extremism of Hadith narrators such as Yahya bin Mu‘in, Ishaaq bin Rahwiya, Ahmad bin Hanbal, Ali bin al-Madini, and Muhammad bin Yahya al-Thuhliy, and deconstruct the Ash‘ari ideology.

Unlike what is commonly thought, ahlul Hadith were not extremists. The imams and narrators of Hadith called for moderation until the extinction of the class we previously mentioned. Ahl al-Hadith facilitated people’s religious matters and livelihood since the Sahaba era until an extremist class such as Ahmad bin Hanbal and his contemporaries emerged. However, excommunicating Muslims did not become a deeply rooted ideology until the emergence of Al Asha‘ira, as we will demonstrate later. Archaeological studies show that the phenomenon of takfir started as individual actions by imams who feared taking too much liberty and publicizing the decisions they made.

A clear example is what Abdullah bin Yazid bin Hermez Sheikh Malik bin Anas said: “We have seen from those before us that if they had been asked about a matter, they said: we all compare this to what happened in the time of the Prophet of Allah, or to what happened in the time of Abu Bakr, or the time of ‘Umar. They said: it is similar, and they said this is all we have [to say]. Then, Rabi‘a, Abul-Zanad, and I went further and said: it is like what happened. Then those who succeeded us said: it is halal or haram. They dared [do] what we abstained from doing like we dared do what our predecessors abstained from doing.”[xi]

This saying reinforces our claim that Muslims lived their lives in breadth and prosperity under the rule of the Sahaba and the Tabi’ien, in moderation, and without challenging the conditions of the era of the Prophet of Islam and Abu Bakr and ‘Umar. If an event occurred, they did not rule by measuring the event to what had happened during the era of the Prophet and the Khulafa’ al Rashidin. Instead, they measured it against events that occurred during their own time, not venturing to issue a fatwa in its regard. It was only during the time of the later Tabi’ien that Abdullah bin Yazid, Rabi‘a al-Rai, Abu al-Zanad, al-Zahri, ‘Ubaidullah ibn ‘Umar, and Yahya bin Sa‘id al-Ansari dared say it was similar. Their students who succeeded them, such as Malik bin Anas, Laith bin Sa‘ad, Muhammad bin Ishaaq, Abdullah bin Luhai‘a, and others, were emboldened to issue fatwas that their ancestors feared issuing. They started regulating people’s lives and their daily affairs with restrictive fatwas that did not exist during the eras of their predecessors, the older Tabi‘ien and Sahaba.

What preceded is proof that the trajectory of takfir was developing upward the more distant it became from the first generation and the first class until the extinction of the last class of moderation and centrism. The phenomenon of takfir started as individual occurrences. The Imam of Khorasan, Ibrahim bin Tahman (died in 163 AH) excommunicated the followers of other groups because of their religious beliefs. Al Hafiz ad-Dhahabi said: “Ishaaq bin Rahwiya said: The hadith of Ibrahim bin Tahman is sahih, and Ahmad bin Hanbal said: He was a Murji’, rigid against Al Jahmiya. I said: This shows that Irja’ for Ahmad is a light bid‘a [trespassing] …. Ibrahim bin Tahman says: Al Jahamiya and Al Qadriya are blasphemy.”[xii]

This nerve to excommunicate Ahlul Qibla was not common among earlier classes. Under this new rule, it became common to rightfully spill the blood of Ahl al Qibla, separate them from their wives, stop generations from inheriting their predecessors, and confiscate their money, all of which are acts that the Sahaba and the Tabi‘un feared committing, and avoided proclaiming. Their successors took the blood, sanctity, and money of Ahlul Qibla lightly and hastily excommunicated Muslims.

Following these events, Imams started having the courage to excommunicate Muslims on an individual basis without it becoming a norm or a current of thought. Al-Hafiz ad-Dhahabi in his translation of Imam Abi Bakr bin ‘Ayash (d. 193 AH) mentioned that: “Hamza bin Sai‘d al-Marzouwi said: ‘I asked Abu Bakr about the Quran and he said: Whoever alleges that the Quran is a creation is blasphemous and a heretic.”[xiii] Imam Abu Bakr lived contemporaneously with the elders, and he narrated from ‘Asim bin abi al-Nujud and his class, such as Ayyub al-Sukhtiyani and al-A‘mash and others.

Yahya bin Sa‘id al-Qahtan (d. 198 AH) also said that Ahlul Qibla should be excommunicated, as did Abdulrahman bin Mahdi (d. 198 AH) and Waki‘ bin al-Jarrah (d. 197 AH).

Al-Hafiz ad-Dhahabi mentions in his translation of Abdulrahman bin Mahdi: “What do you say of him who says the Quran was created? He said: if I had the authority, I would sit next to a bridge and ask whoever crosses it, and if he says created, I would break his neck and throw his body in the water.”[xiv] This is precisely what ISIS did when it killed anyone who differed in opinion. In 2015, they drove many of those who disagreed with them in Raqqa to the bank of the Euphrates, shot them, and threw their bodies in the river. These acts were documented in filmed videos published by ISIS’ own news agency, and they spread widely on social media.

It is incoherent to denounce the actions of ISIS and remain silent about the actions of the founding fathers regarding the phenomenon of excommunicating Muslims out of fear of being accused of offending imams and scholars of Islam. We say: Among the classes of Companions, Successors, and Successors of Successors (tabi‘in and tabi‘in al tabi‘in) are those who have rulings and opinions on which one can rely to do without the views of the extremists and the first generation of those declaring Muslims as infidels.

If one refuses to denounce the words of Imam Abd al-Rahman bin Mahdi about killing those who oppose him by saying that the Qur’an was created and throwing them into the river, then one cannot denounce the actions of ISIS. These early imams’ rulings created the formative facts on which ISIS’ actions were based. ISIS policies and actions. There is no difference between what Imam Abdul Rahman bin Mahdi intended to do and what ISIS did, and there is no way to denounce one of the actions and not the other.

Al-Hafiz al-Dhahabi, in his translation of Imam Yahya bin Sa‘id al-Qattan, says: “Yahya bin Sa‘id said: ‘whoever says: Say He is Allah, [who is] one a creation is a blasphemous infidel.”[xv]

One should not assume that we are confounding Ahlul Hadith with the Imams of Al-Asha‘ira despite their disparities and antagonisms. What we are attempting to do here is to construct a historical archaeology of the emergence of the takfir of Ahlul Qibla in the second half of the second Hijri century and its nonexistence during the century of the Sahaba, the Tabi‘ien, and the class of the followers of the Tabi‘ien.

Yahya bin Sa‘id al-Qattan is the brother of Abdullah bin Sa‘id al-Qattan al-Kullabi, founder of the Kulabiya sect, inspired Abul Hassan al-Ash‘ari’s opinions on the oneness of Allah and his attributes and on justice, despite the accusations against Abdullah bin Sa‘id of his “corrupt” intentions while putting together his doctrine in oneness to please his Christian sister. Sheikh-ul Islam Ibn Taymiyya denied and debunked these accusations, as mentioned by Al-Dhahabi in his translation of Abdullah bin Sa‘id al-Qattan: “Our Sheikh, Ibn Taymiyya, said [of bin Sa‘id]: he was virtuous, knowledgeable, and a believer, and saying his doctrine is to bring the Christian creed to Muslims, under the pretext that he sought to satisfy his sister, are lies about him by the Mu‘tazila and the Jahamiyya whom he responded to. They alleged that whoever proves [eternal attributes] agrees with Christians.” [xvi]

 This is not the venue to explain this issue. However, the historical trajectory of the development of the phenomenon of takfir, and its shift from the first layers of extremism of Ahlul Hadith to Al-Asha‘ira after that required us to mention the Imam Yahya bin Sa‘id al-Qattan and the legacy of his brother, Imam Abdullah bin Sa‘id al-Kullabiy and his doctrine of the oneness of the Creator and His attributes that were later taken on by Abul Hassan al-Ash‘ari, who formulated them within the framework and foundations of al-Ash‘ariya.

At the end of the second Hijri century, between 199 and 200 A.H., the phenomenon of takfir entered its second historical phase. After it had been an individual phenomenon, adopted only by some scholars scattered around the world, it shifted into a collective phenomenon adopted by a community of scholars who possess the same characteristics and attributes and adopt the same apparent creed. Out of this emerged the Ahlul Hadith school of thought. Hadith classification expanded, more hadiths appeared, and Ilm al-Rijal and Ilm al-Tabaqat emerged. The phenomenon of takfir turned from an individual phenomenon to a communal phenomenon led by individuals and the Imams of the hadith school. Hadith classification expanded, and  ‘Ilm al-rijal, jarh wal ta‘deel, and ‘ilm al tabaqat emerged. Therefore, the phenomenon of takfir became more common and in use by the imams of hadith school.

‘Affan bin Mulsim (d. 220 A.H.), the sheikh of Ahmad bin Hanbal and Yahya bin Mu‘in, charged the Mu‘tazila with heresy, and so did Hisham bin Abdul-Malik Abu Walid al-Tayalsi (d. 227 A.H.), imam of Basra who was sought for his knowledge of Hadith after Abi Dawood al Tayalsi. Abul Waleed said: “Whoever does not believe in his heart that the Quran is not a creation is a heretic.”[xvii] The Imam of Khorasan Yahya bin Yahya al-Tamimi, an Imam Malik bin Anas student, judged al-qadiriyya as heresy. He said: “Whoever argues that one verse of the Quran, beginning to end, is created, is kafir.”[xviii] Ishac bin Rahawayh, Yhaya bin Mouin, Ali bin al-Madini, Ahmad bin Hanbal, Abu Hatem, Abu Zaraa al-Razayan, Muhammad bin Yahya al-Thuhli al-Nisapuri, and others went on to declare ahlul Qibla as heretics. “From his pulpit, Ali bin al-Medini said: ‘Whoever presumes that the Quran is a creation is a heretic, and whoever presumes that God is invisible is a heretic,’”[xix] despite him having said that the Quran is a creation when Al-Ma’mun tested judges, scholars, and hadith experts. When Ishac bin Ibrahim, Al-Ma’mun’s deputy, examined al-Medini, he said that the Quran is a creation, as if calling himself blasphemous.

It is impossible to call Muslims or ahlul Qibla who pray toward the Ka‘aba heretics, even if they disagree over what is open to jurisprudence and what is not known with certainty to be an integral part of religion. Muslim creeds disagreeing over similar issues cannot be called blasphemous or heretics.

Ahmad bin Hanbal went to judging individuals as heretics, calling them by name, unlike his predecessors. His predecessors made general statements such as “whoever believes the Quran is a heretic,” without specifying persons and names.

Ahmad bin Hanbal was specific with texts and names. “Abu Bakr al-Khallal, in Kitab al-Sunna, said: Hassan bi Ayyub al-Makhrami said: I said to Ahmad bin Hanbal: Ibn Abi Dawood? He said: unbeliever in God.”[xx]

This audacity to declare Muslims non-believers did not exist in the time of the Sahaba, the Tabieen, and their followers. They were cautious in their rulings on worship and obedience, let alone on creeds.

Judging Muslims as non-believers is a monumental issue, and more important than the generalization of takfir is the takfir of a Muslim individual by name. This is a judgment to be made only by the Prophet of Allah and none other since he was the last to receive revelations. It is commonly said in hadith books that whenever Umar ibn al-Khattab wanted to decapitate a Muslim, thinking that he was a non-believer, the Prophet of Islam stopped him, because declaring Muslims heretic is a judgment reserved to God and the Prophet of Islam. After the death of the Prophet and the interruption of revelation, no Muslim can declare another an infidel and a heretic.

Whoever claims to have the right to declare other Muslims heretics also gives other Muslims the right to declare him a heretic and an infidel. This will cause great chaos, where Muslims will be judging each other.

This chaos happened several times in Islamic history, and members of the same sect judged each other, as is the case today. Scholars’ haste to excommunicate each other caused great social strife, disruption, and antagonisms between people.

This happened when the debate of whether the Quran was created became a matter of contention, and judges and scholars were tested about it.

Ahmad bin Hanbal and a slew of his companions and students became stricter, excommunicating those who believed in the creation of the Quran. In 200 A.H., the ahlul hadith school became a secret society whose members corresponded with each other from their different provinces, communicating to each other the names of those who believed in the creation of the Quran and those who did not. Ahmad bin Hanbal wrote from Baghdad to Ishaac bin Rahawayh in Nishapur, Muhammad bin Yahya al-Thuhli in Khorasan, and Abi Ishaaq al-Jowjazi in Damascus to that effect, and they wrote back reporting the same to him.

Ahmad bin Hanbal became stricter with his own companions such as Yahya bin Mu‘in, the imam of al-jarh wal ta‘deel, and Ali bin al-Madini, sheikh of al-Bukhari, and he asked to stop quoting their hadiths, as Abu Zar‘a al-Razi said: “Ahmad bin Hanbal did not take into consideration the writing of Abi Nasr al-Tammar, Yahya bin Mu‘in, Ali bin al-Madini, or any of those who were examined and answered.”[xxi]

The school of Hadith became even more stringent and excommunicated even those who had no say on whether the Quran was a creation or not. Muhammad bin Yahya al-Thuhli accused Imam al-Bukhari (Sahih Bukhari) of corrupting the creed with heresy and forced him to leave Nishapur after inciting people against him. He wrote to Bukhara’s governor, Khalid bin Ahmad al-Thuhli, who made Bukhari leave the city. He also wrote to Abi Hatem and Abi Zar‘a al-Raziyyein in Rey to abandon the Hadith of Bukhari. Bukhari died of a stroke, homeless with no city to call home because of the wrath of the school of Hadith for saying that the Quran was created.

Abu Hamed bin al-Sharqi said: I heard Muhammad bin Ali al-Thuhli say: whoever claims that the Quran is a creation is kafir and must be separated from his wife, if he does not repent, he should be killed, and his money is confiscated, and whoever utters that the Quran is a creation is a heretic who should be ostracized, who went after this to Muhammad bin Ismail [Imam al-Bukhari] was accused, because no one would be in his presence if he did not belong to his sect.”[xxii]

To remain brief, we will not mention all instances that indicate how commonplace takfir had become in the hadith school, which became a closed secret society headed by Ahmad bin Hanbal while he lived, and Ishaaq bin Rahawayh attack on Dawood al-Zahiri to kill him in his majlis in Nishapur, where he said: “The Quran is recent[ly created], and Muhammad bin Yahya al-Thuhli wrote in that regard to Ahmad bin Hanbal in Baghdad, and Ahmad refused to see Dawood when the latter asked to see him.”

This school became so extreme that Ahmad bin Hanbal accused the talented and knowledgeable Al-Harith bin Asad al-el-Muhasibi al-Zahed of heresy when he denied that God speaks with a voice. Ahmad bin Hanbal said: “Today, I warn of al-Hareth.”[xxiii] He also accused Imam al-Qalanisi of heresy.

The audacity of Ahmad bin Hanbal and Ahlul Hadith to excommunicate paved the way for Ash‘aris to transform the phenomenon of takfir into a foundational ideology in the third and last phase of its historical trajectory. Therefore, takfir turned from an individual phenomenon by the end of the second Hijri century, embraced only by some imams and scholars, to a communal practice of the hadith school in the first half of the third Hijri century. By the fourth Hijri century, takfir became a deeply rooted ideology with the Ash‘aris. They formulated it as part of the foundations of the creed. If we were to look into Ash‘ari books, we would find that excommunicating other Muslims is a systematic and strict methodology. They did not confine takfir to theoretical foundational disagreements like the characteristics of the Maker, but expanded it to include actions. This is an extreme position over which people protested al-Khawarij, who were excommunicating Muslims over actions, not beliefs. Here is an example of Abu Mansur al-Baghdadi excommunicating a Muslim over negligible actions, he said: “We hereby excommunicate al-Asamm for denying the validity of rental contracts, which the predecessors had validated, allowing wuduu’ with using vinegar, and finally we hereby excommunicate him for denying  incidental characteristics [a‘rad].”[xxiv]

This text reveals two matters:

First, it shows the excommunication of Muslims over actions and beliefs, such as when al-Khawarij assumed that there was a consensus regarding rental contracts when many other scholars disagreed. Here is not the place to elaborate on this issue. What is more serious is excommunicating al-Asamm for his opinion on the validity of wuduu’ using vinegar. This constitutes a great exaggeration and an audacity in excommunicating Muslims.

Second, the takfir of al-Asamm for denying the existence of incidental characteristics. No Quranic verse, Hadith, or Sahabi suggests that denying the a‘rad is heresy. There is no mention of a‘rad either in the Quran or in Hadith. This indicates that the Ash‘ari imams believed themselves to be more knowledgeable in the principles of the creed than the Sahaba.

From what preceded, we can deduce that Ash‘aris excommunicated other Muslim groups for contradicting their own beliefs and principles. We definitively demonstrated that the a‘rad mentioned by the Ash‘aris and the basis of which they excommunicated Ahlul Qibla for denying are characteristics of matter and the body, not as the Ash‘aris suggested. So why did they excommunicate Muslims who denied a‘rad? The previous section proved that the discussion of bodies and a‘rad, and that no body exists without a‘rad, are Greek theories that were common among philosophers. This means that Ash‘aris excommunicated other Muslims for Greek propositions.

To be fair, we will provide further evidence to show researchers that this was a deep-rooted methodology and ideology for the Ash‘aris. Al-Baghdadi said: “Our companions said that unnecessarily eating pork and not fearing to wear the clothing of infidels in Muslim lands without coercion are indications of kufr.”[xxv]

Al-Baghdadi said: “Our companions said: A proof of the consensus of Ash‘aris over takfir of Muslims is that it is [their] method and an ideology, and no issue is consensus unless it is a principle and a method.”

Eating pork and wearing the clothes of infidels are actions, not creeds – intentions matter in these actions. Eating pork while believing it is halal is a clear contradiction of the Quran, and contradicting the Quran is kufr by consensus. Eating pork without thinking it is kufr is debauchery and immorality, not judged as kufr.

Most Muslims today, if not all, wear “the dress of infidels” without the intention to emulate them. Therefore, most Muslims today are infidels for Ash‘aris. No Muslim dresses this coerced.

What gave the Ash‘aris this power to excommunicate Muslims for actions? They strayed to an unnecessary extremism.

Ash‘aris exaggerated in excommunicating Muslis and Ahlul Qibla for actions when Abu Mansur al-Baghdadi said: “We excommunicated al-karamiya for having said that intending prayer is not mandatory and that initially accepting Islam suffices.”[xxvi]

Having excommunicated Muslims who do not state their intention before praying, al-Baghdadi clearly acknowledges the [acceptability of] excommunicating Muslims. Which right, text, or Sunna do they rely upon to excommunicate a Muslim who prays without stating intent before prayer? Aren’t wudu’ and taking the initiative to pray enough intent? Aren’t preparations for prayer, turning toward the Qibla, and dressing properly intent?

However, the greatest tragedy is that Ash‘aris paved the way for excommunicating Muslims and removing all obstacles facing the takfir phenomenon invading Muslim societies and countries today. By excommunicating all other Muslim groups, they gave Islamist movements today the audacity to excommunicate their own societies and any Muslim who does not join them. Abu Mansur al-Baghdadi said: “I know that the takfir of every leader of the Mu‘tazila is a duty […]”[xxvii] He proceeded to name them one by one, starting with Wasil bin ‘Ata’, ‘Amro bin ‘Obeid, Abi el-Huthail al-‘Allaf, Ibrahim al-Nizam, Ma‘mmar, and ending with Al-Jaba’i and his son, Abu Hashim, excommunicating them all. What is baffling is that he excommunicated them based on sayings and belief principles they did not utter or state, and of which they are innocent.

Scrutinizing these sayings led us to believe that Abu Mansur al-Baghdadi did not bother verifying these claims’ veracity. We have uncovered a major problem: he relied on “The Mu‘tazila Scandal” by Ibn al-Rawandi, an atheist, to ascribe sayings to Al Mu‘tazila that they never said. He excommunicated them based on the claims of Ibn al-Rawandi.

This method is unscientific and biased, i.e., relying on a source written by an atheist to excommunicate Muslims.

Our claims can be verified by looking into the accusations of Al-Baghdadi in his book, “Al Farq Bein Al Firaq,” then into Ibn al-Rawandi’s book “The Mu‘tazila Scandal,” and finally into “Al-Intisar” by Al Khayyat al-Mu‘tazili’, the book in which the latter responded to Ibn al-Rawandi. The reader will be stupefied to realize that al-Baghdadi was quoting Ibn al-Rawandi in his accusations against the imams of Al Mu‘tazila, and wrongly ascribing to them what they never said.

The gravest accusation of Al Rawandi was against Ibrahim al-Nizam. He ascribed to al-Nizam statements on beliefs that al-Nizam had argued against.

To remain brief, since our goal is not to respond to al-Baghdadi, we would have detailed every accusation he made in both his books and showed their origins in Al-Rawandi’s book. We would have also expanded on Abi al-Hussein al-Khayyat’s response in his book “Al-Intisar.”

We do not absolve Al-Mu‘tazila from their missteps and mistakes in their statements of belief, nor do we declare them innocent of accusing other Muslims and Ahlul Qibla of kufr and sentencing them to death.

It is commonly known that Al-Ma’mun, who belonged to Al-Mu‘tazila, tested judges, hadith experts, and notables on their opinions about the Quran. From Tartus, he wrote to his deputy in Baghdad, Ishaac bin Ibrahim, in 212 A.H. saying: “Gather judges in your presence and test them on what they say and reveal their beliefs about God’s creation of the Quran, […] that who says it is created, ban him from issuing fatwas and narrating. If he insists on his shirk, pushing that the Quran is a creation, decapitate him and send us his head.”[xxviii]

Al Ma’mun contented himself with accusing those opposing Al-Mu‘tazila of heresy and atheism and of threatening them. On the other hand, Caliph Al-Wathiq (d. 234 A.H.) killed Ahmad bin Nasr al-Khuza‘i when he questioned him: “What do you say about the Quran? He said: ‘The word of God.’ Is it a creation? He asked. He said: ‘The word of God.’ Will you see your God on Judgment Day? ‘This is what the narrative says, he answered.’ And he speaks, he is seen, he is confined to a space, and he is bound by the vision of the onlooker? […] He called al-Samasima and said: if I head toward this infidel, no one goes with me. He decapitated him and ordered his head be transported to Baghdad, erecting it for several days on the Eastern side and several days on the Western side.”[xxix] Al Mu‘tazila, like other sects, excommunicated its opposition starting in 200 A.H. after Al Ma’mun joined their group, and they ascended to power during his and the rule of his brother, Al Mu‘tasim, followed by Al-Wathiq.

However, their excommunication by Al-Baghdadi was a result of many false accusations. This problem [of takfir] metastasized, becoming an ideology and paving the way for his successors to excommunicate Muslims without apprehension, verification, or research. It emboldened anyone with an opinion or an aspiration to excommunicate whoever opposes him without probable cause.

Therefore, according to which opinion did the Ash‘aris excommunicate Muslim sects that opposed them and the Greek theories upon which they built their beliefs?

 Al Ash‘aris reached a peak of extremism never approached by anyone before. Abu Mansur al-Baghdadi said: “Those in doubt of the infidelity of those with differring opinions, do they doubt that their statements are corrupt or not? They are infidels. […] We excommunicate those who doubt their heresy.”[xxx]

This is an extreme form of judging people and excommunicating them unfairly without proof. They excommunicated all those who doubted the infidelity of those who opposed the Ash‘aris. They compulsorily excommunicated those who opposed them and then surpassed it by excommunicating those who doubted the excommunication.

Takfir was an Ash‘ari method and ideology, and it was not confined to Al-Baghdadi alone. It surpassed him to Ash‘ari imams in general, such as Al-Baqlani, Ibn Mujahid al-Ta’I, Imam al-Haramein al-Juwaini, Imam Al-Ghazali, and others.

In his book, At-Tamheed al-Awaa’il wa Talkhees ud-Dalaa’il, Imam Al-Baqillani derided Al-Mu‘tazila, and he accused them of being the followers of Christians, even worse than Christians. He excommunicated them, putting them in the same class as polytheists for having stated that: “Al Mu‘tazila said that the Word of God is created, following Christians who say that the Word of God is created […]. They surpassed Christians, and they all said that create like God creates, make like He makes movement, quiet, volition, and sciences, agreeing with those who believe in shirk and creation as God creates. […] If I were to follow all their false claims and ugly pretenses that they included in religion, violating Sunna and the beliefs of all Muslims, this book would be much longer.” [xxxi]

Al-Baghdadi had only excommunicated them, while Al-Baqillani accused them of polytheism, the highest form of kufr. However, most of what Al-Baqillani quoted from Mu‘ammar , Al-‘Allaf, Al-Nizam, Al-Jaba’I, and Bashr bin al-Mu‘tamir, he did not understand or he relied on sources opposed to Al Mu‘tazila who ascribed to them statements they did not make.

Ash‘aris did not stop at excommunicating some Imams. Takfir was their method since the founding of their sect. Some speak of Abul Hassan al-Ash‘ari backing down from his excommunications of Muslims. However, his book debunks these claims. His handwritten books silence the claims that he walked back from takfir at the end of his life, because the takfir of other Islamic sects is omnipresent in his books. Abul Hassan Al-Ash‘ari said: “The response to Al-Mu‘tazila is: Didn’t the Majus prove that Satan can do evil that God cannot do, which makes them infidels? Indeed. Then say to them: If you argue that infidels can be blasphemous and God cannot, you surpassed what the Majus said, and you say with them: Satan can do evil that God cannot do.”[xxxii]

Abi al-Hassan al-Ash‘ari made strange arguments that his followers could not answer and that they could hardly defend, such as:

• He made Al Mu‘tazila’s beliefs worse than those of the Majus, a clear takfir, proving that takfir is a method for Al-Asha‘ira and their imams.
• It can be said to Al Ash‘ari: You excommunicated Al Mu‘tazila when you said that their claim that ‘Satan can do evil that God cannot do’ is kufr. Do you mean that God is like Satan, able to do evil, for the Mu‘tazila not to be kafir? God is high above those who claim this.

When Al-Ash‘ari separated from Al-I‘tizal, “He stood on a chair in the mosque of Basra and yelled: Those who have known me have known me, and those who have not, I am such son of such, I used to say that Quran is a creation, that God cannot be seen, and that I do evil. I repent and believe in responding to Al-Mu‘tazila. Witness that I was not a Muslim and that I became a Muslim now.”[xxxiii]

This is an indisputable claim of Al-Ash‘aris excommunicating Al-Mu‘tazila and any sect that opposes them, in the words of their founder Abil Hassan Al-Ash‘ari Ali bin Isma‘il as witnessed in the mosque of Basra, and that takfir is their ideology and method that they pass on generation after generation until today.

We are not absolving Al-Mu‘tazila from foundational mistakes in their beliefs. We are only demonstrating the method of Al-Ash‘aris in excommunicating Muslims based on suspicion or ignorance of intent and motives. This is also the method of their successors, unwittingly taking Ash‘ari imams as role models until this became the model according to which Muslim societies were built in the following centuries and until today.

Muslims commonly accuse others within their own communities without knowledge or proof, ascribe to others many lies, fight based on suspicion, unjustly judge others, and accuse of betrayal those with a different opinion.

Ash‘ari imams did not know that their method of strife against those opposing them will become a lifestyle for Muslims in general during the centuries-long trajectory of history. However, this happened, and it became a feature of Muslim societies.

This method becomes clear when researchers scrutinize Ash‘ari Islamic movements like the Muslim Brotherhood, Al Jama‘a Al Islamiyya, Al ‘Adala wal Tanmiya, Annahda, and others. When they fight their rivals in Muslim countries, oppose governments and regimes in their own countries, or stand against intellectuals and civil movements, they accuse them of kufr, betrayal, being agents for external powers, or resort to conspiracy theories that claim the alliance of external powers with internal parties in order to push them out of political life. To accomplish this, they use unfounded and unjust accusations, putting together myths that they ascribe to their rivals, be they political parties or governments, to incite people to rebel against the authorities. They attribute to them opinions and ideas they did not claim to alienate people from them. For example, they accuse other political parties of being hostile to religion because of their secularism. Intellectuals are accused of advocating for moral decadence, breaking up families, spreading pornographic ideas, and other accusations that offend people because of the liberalism of those intellectuals and their calls for free thought and the rejection of traditions, falsely interpreting their words for people to reject their ideas, causing a schism between them and common Muslims, using slander and falsehoods. This became common in Egypt since the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928 A.D. The Brotherhood followed this approach during the era of the monarchy and then later after the coup of Gamal Abdel Nasser and his fellow officers.

The opinions of Abil A‘la Al Mudawi, the emir of Al Jama‘a Al Islamiya in Pakistan and Sayyid Qutb in Egypt, regarding the kufr of ruling regimes and political parties that do not rule under God’s law are not a recent phenomenon. They were true to their Ash‘ari beliefs in calling their rivals kuffar. This was followed by the appearance of other movements and groups, such as the Jama‘a al Islamiyya, Al Jihad, and Al Takfir wal Hijra in Egypt, who called society as a whole heretic. Islamic movements then appeared in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Algeria, Tunisia, Syria, Turkey, and other Muslim countries, all of which accused regimes and parties of kufr for not adhering to Islamic rule and excommunicated intellectuals who did not agree.

The emergence of Ash‘ari media, satellite channels, social media, Telegram channels, and other modern media drove Ash‘ari ideology into the mainstream, dominating secular, leftist, and nationalist ideologies that had been common for some decades of the twentieth century. These ideologies could not compete with Ash‘ariya since the latter had been common in Muslim societies for a thousand years. Ash‘ariya lost its authority for a brief period because of the rise of Western civilization and its production during the Industrial Revolution, and its political, social, and intellectual theories, ideas, and values. The Western Renaissance got the attention of people around the world, including those in Islamic countries. When this bedazzlement faded, the West’s progress lost steam, knowledge and technological advances became common everywhere, and Muslims went back to Ash‘ari ideology, pushing back against Western ideologies. Since the 1980s, a Muslim awakening has spread Ash‘ari ideology in Muslim societies again. The roots of Ash‘ari ideology were still alive in the depths of Muslim societies, in their traditions, habits, and school and university education, even though it had disappeared from curriculums for a while during the domination of Western thought. This ideology took over Muslim countries starting in the 21^st century. Muslims lean toward Muslim movements such as Al Qaeda, the Muslim Brotherhood, Al Jama‘a Al Islamiyya, Taliban, Jabhat An-Nusra, ISIS, and Boko Haram.

Muslims all over the world celebrated 9/11 when Al Qaeda bombed Washington and New York, even if Muslim governments denounced these facts. Muslims were happy about what happened to Americans that day.

When the events started in Arab countries in 2011, and people rebelled against ruling regimes, the ousted Tunisian President Zeinulabideen bin Ali in January 2011, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in February 2011, then crises hit Libya, Yemen, and Syria, it was Muslim movements that led people, and people leaned toward them. Ash‘ari movements won the elections in Tunisia and Egypt, with Annahda in Tunisia and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt winning a majority of parliament seats and the presidency in Egypt.

If fair elections are to happen in Muslim countries, Islamic movements will win the majority of parliamentary seats and presidencies, not because of their convincing economic, development, labor, and anti-corruption programs, but because of the Ash‘ari roots dominating the cultural, social, political, and intellectual traditions in these countries for a thousand years.

The joy that manifested in Muslim societies in August, 2021 when the United States pulled out of Afghanistan and Taliban took over Kabul was not driven by hate for the United States or for ridiculing its loss after 20 years of war, the killing of thousands of its soldiers, and the billions of dollars in waste. It was the result of the victory of the Taliban, and the affinity Muslims have with Ash‘ari movements and thought.

The silence of Islamic societies regarding the atrocities of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) in beheading Muslims and non-Muslims in Mosul, Raqqa, Palmyra, Ramadi, and Camp Speicher since 2014, and capturing women and girls in Sinjar, confiscating people’s money, and the killing and burning of prisoners, is evidence of Muslims’ satisfaction with their policies and conduct, because of the predominance of the Ash’ari belief systems, despite the participation of some Muslim countries in the air strikes that the international coalition against terrorism has implemented since 2014. This participation is a front, and it does not depict reality.

The spread of takfir in Muslim societies today and the acceptance by Muslims of the spread and prevalence of takfir among Islamic movements and groups without any objection from Muslims is evidence and clear proof of the strength of the Ash’ari heritage in these societies and its deep roots that has imbued these societies with its character.

There is no way to eliminate the phenomenon of takfir of Muslims except by dismantling the origins of the Ash’ari tradition. This will liberate Islamic societies from its grip, return to the origins of Islam in the first centuries of Islam, and to the era of moderation and centrism that prevailed until the second half of the second century A.H.

Nothing will repair Muslim societies except what had repaired them in the beginning.

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[i] Tarikh Al-Islam Al-Hafiz Al-Dhahabi, Volume 2, p. 171, Dar Al Kotob al ‘Ilmiya, Lebanon, Beirut, 2005.

[ii] Ibid, Volume 2, p. 193.

[iii] Maqalat al-Islamiyyin wa Ikhtilaf al-Musallin, Abul Hassan Al-Ash‘ari, p. 25, Dar Al Hikmah, first edition 1994, Syria – Damascus.

[iv] Tarikh Al-Islam Al-Hafiz Al-Dhahabi, Volume 3, p. 4, Dar Al Kotob al ‘Ilmiya, Lebanon, Beirut, 2005.

[v] Ibid, Volume 2, p. 507.

[vi] Ibid, Volume 2, p. 524.

[vii] Ibid, Volume 2, p.80.

[viii] Ibid, Volume 3, p. 454.

[ix] Ibid, Volume 6, p. 6.

[x] Ibid, Volume 4, p. 128.

[xi] Ibid, Volume 3, p. 542.

[xii] Ibid, Volume 4, p. 345.

[xiii] Ibid, Volume 5, p. 337.

[xiv] Ibid, Volume 5, p. 264.

[xv] Ibid, Volume 5, p. 326.

[xvi] Ibid, Volume 6, p. 343.

[xvii] Ibid, Volume 6, p. 158.

[xviii] Ibid, Volume 6, p. 166.

[xix] Ibid, Volume 6, p. 280.

[xx] Ibid, Volumme 6, p. 185.

[xxi] Ibid, Volume 6, p. 331.

[xxii] Ibid, Volume 6, p. 679.

[xxiii] Ibid, Volume 6, p. 435.

[xxiv] Usul al-Din, ‘Abd el-Qaher bin Taher al-Baghdadi, p. 195, Al-Dawla Press, Istanbul, 1928.

[xxv] Ibid, p. 226.

[xxvi] Ibid, p. 190.

[xxvii] Ibid, p. 355.

[xxviii] Tarikh al-Islam, Al-Hafiz Al-Dhahabi, Volume 5, p. 508-511, Dar Al Kotob Al ‘Ilmiyah, Beirut, 2005.

[xxix] Ibid, Volume 6, p. 192.

[xxx] Ibid, p. 343.

[xxxi] At-Tamheed al-Awaa’il wa Talkhees ud-Dalaa’il, Judge Abu Bakr Al-Baqillani, p. 286-293, Muassasat Al Kotob Al Thaqafiya, 2016.

[xxxii] Al Ibana ‘An Usul Al Diyana, Abul Hassan Al-Ash‘ari, p. 71, Dar Al Kotob Al ‘Ilmiya, Beirut, 2022.

[xxxiii] Tarikh al-Islam, Al-Hafiz Al-Dhahabi, Volume 8, p. 69, Dar Al Kotob Al ‘Ilmiyah, Beirut, 2005.

Glossary of Terms

• Al Khawarij: They are the third sect in Islam, alongside the Sunnis and the Shiite sect. They emerged from the army of Ali bin Abi Talib in the last days of the Siffin War. They include the following sects: the Azariqa, the Sufriyah, the Najdat, and the Ibadiya, and they are currently present in the Sultanate of Oman and Algeria.
• Al Muhakkima Al Ula: They were the first group of Kharijites who emerged from the army of Ali bin Abi Talib and said: “There is no rule except for God’s.” Their leaders at that time were: ‘Urwa bin Khadir, Abdullah bin Al-Kawa’, and Abdullah bin Wahb Al-Rasibi. They set up a camp for them in the outskirts of Kufa in 37 A.H./658 AD.
• Yawm al Nahrawan: The Battle of Nahrawan took place in 38 A.H./659 AD between the army of Ali bin Abi Talib and the Kharijites, in which many of both groups were killed.
• Al Hakimiyyah wal Takfir: A doctrine based on the necessity of an Islamic rule and the excommunication of those who reject it.
• Kufr Shirk: An action that makes whoever commits it an infidel and a polytheist.
• Kufr Ni‘ma:  An action that does not make those who commit it an infidel or a polytheist.
• Ahlul Qibla: All those who pray toward Mekka/the Qibla.
• Badriy: Those who witnessed the Battle of Badr between Muslims and Qureish.
• Al Quran as creation: A philosophical statement that the Mu’tazila believed, and that indicates that the Word of God is not eternal, but rather, it was created. This was opposed and denied by hadith scholars and Ash’aris, who believed that the Word of God is eternal and that those who believe that the Quran and the Word of God are created, not eternal, are infidels.
• Ahlul Hadith: They are a sect of Sunnis who follow Hadith and what it says without interpretation or justification, and it rejects the doctrine of analogy, opinion, and interpretation.
• ‘Ilm al Tabaqat: A science specific to Islamic history that follows the generations of Companions, followers, and the narrators of Hadith and their history to differentiate the end of each generation or class from the next generation or class.
• ‘Ilm al Rijal: A science that is specific to the scholars of Hadith, following the conditions of the narrators of Hadith, their truthfulness, falsification, and the strength/quality of their memories to ensure the authenticity of their narrated Hadiths.
• Al Jarh wal Ta‘dil: A science that specializes in the scholars of Hadith, with books on the conditions of the narrators of Hadith, including truthfulness, weakness, strength, and authenticity.
• Counted by the spike: A method of counting the casualties in a battle by throwing a spike at each dead body, then collecting the spikes and counting them. (Considered to be an accurate way of counting).
• Al Qadariyya: An Islamic group that believes that fate does not determine actions; instead, humans create their actions and are not coerced to do them. They are the predecessors of the Mu‘tazila.
• Al Jahamiyyah: They are the followers of Jahm bin Safwan (Salam bin Ahuz beheaded him in 128 A.H./746 A.D.). He used to believe that man is destined to do his actions and is not free. He believed in the creation of the Quran and was killed for this belief.
• Al Murji’a: An older Islamic group who did not opine on Uthman bin Affan and Ali bin Abi Talib, and they did not challenge or agree with them and said: We postpone their matter to God [to judge them].
• Al Kullabiyya: Followers of Abdullah bin Saeed Al-Qattan Al-Basri, who was the first to claim the eternity of the Word of God and that the Quran is not a creation. Abu Al-Hasan Al-Ash‘ari relied on some of his opinions to establish the Ash‘ari belief. Abdullah bin Saeed died between 220 and 240 A.H.
• Al Inghimas: Piercing through the enemy’s ranks and fighting them to death. It is very similar to a suicide bomber.