Russia and Ukraine between Newtonian and Quantum Conditions: The Emergence of the Ukraine-Poland Pole

When physicists cannot predict the movement trajectory or the behavior of a particle or a mass and find it difficult to pinpoint its location, where it occurs, when it rests, or when it suddenly restarts its motion without prior indications to its observer, then this is a quantum physical occurrence. It is caused by the particle departing from the rules of conventional physics that make it possible for the observer to know its movement trajectory and predict when it stops and restarts its motion. The particles adhering to these material laws led to the emergence of the conventional classical Newtonian paradigm in physics. It is a hermetic, comprehensive system of laws that does not fail to be applicable and operational. This makes it possible for the observer to comprehend and leverage this knowledge and predict the evolution of classical physical occurrences from start to finish since they conform entirely and submit to the laws governing them. The observer can predict its movement and future evolution and produce exhaustive knowledge about it.
Political occurrences also sometimes behave according to classical Newtonian laws. The observer can know the extent of its evolution and its future movement and predict the consequences and results of its trajectory. Other times, political occurrences behave in a quantum manner, making it impossible for the observer to know its course, predict its behavior, or the rationale of a decision between alternative options.
Russian-Ukrainian relations overwhelmed the classical schools of political analysis and revealed their shortcomings. They have been unable to produce a comprehensive list of the causes of strife, animosity, and wars between them at times and the restoration and rectitude of the relations between them at other times. These changes are not subject to constant laws and do not belong to a clear system on which one can rely to define its future or predict the occurrences and events before they happen. The reason is that these relations sometimes behave according to classical Newtonian laws, giving the observer a chance to comprehend its evolution and predict its future. In other instances, they act in a quantum manner that cannot be subjected to predictions because they contradict classical material physical laws, perplexing and distressing observers incapable of realizing and comprehending the path these occurrences take and the horizons of their future developments.
The mysterious behavior of political occurrences rendered Russian leadership historically unable to understand the oscillation of Russian-Ukranian relations between these two paths. Russians designed their strategies and policies with Ukraine based on classical Newtonian foundations and laws. They succeeded when political occurrences submitted to Newtonian laws and behaved classically, evidenced by good, neighborly relations and the establishing of a long-term alliance since the Mogul conquest of Russia and Ukraine in the 13th century. These strategies failed when political occurrences took an unpredictable quantum course, contradicting Newtonian laws. This became evident during periods of strained political relations, conflicting strategies, disparate interests, and the onset of strife and wars.
Russian-Ukrainian relations have been following a quantum behavior since the disintegration of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 when Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk signed the Declaration on the Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) with Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev.
This remains the course it is taking, reaching its peak in 2014, ending in Russia’s military campaign against Ukraine and the ongoing war since February 2022.
We will look into the disparities between classical Newtonian political occurrences and quantum occurrences, dissecting the characteristics, factors, and attributes of each.
The Classical Condition:
Two political occurrences or states are in classical relations when they share a geopolitical partnership coupled with a geoeconomic cooperation, an agreement in their values, principles, and intellectual system, and an alignment between their interests, goals, and objectives.
The classical condition extends to the political relations between these two occurrences when geopolitical and geoeconomic competition emerges, discrepancies between their values, principles, and intellectual systems appear without rivalry, and a divergence in their interests and objectives without discord or clashing.
Similar dynamics occur when geopolitical competitiveness or rivalry arises between them, coupled with geoeconomic competition, contradictions in values and principles, and clashing interests and objectives.
In the event of a contradiction between these characteristics, and if one element comes to the forefront and another is concealed, a geopolitical partnership starts coupled with a geoeconomic rivalry and conflicting values and principles. The political relation departs from a Newtonian to a quantum state, as will be discussed later.
Applying these rules and criteria to the Russia-Ukraine relations reveals the reasons for the disturbed political relations between them. It explains the oscillation between sound, healthy, and neighborly relations and spoiled and unstable relations, military campaigns, and wars.
The characteristics of classical Newtonian political relationships reveal that occurrences submit to rules under a system of material formulas that can be controlled and its trajectory directed and pushed towards desired objectives and results. Occurrences can be predicted and contained, strife can be averted, problems can be solved, chaos can be quelled before intensifying, and crises can be subdued before escalating.
To compare and contrast the characteristics and features of political occurrences in the classical Newtonian and quantum states and the physical occurrences in the classical Newtonian and quantum states, we give this material example that shows the contradiction between these cases:
In the classical state, when the energy of the electromagnetic field surrounding the atom is 9 MeV (mega electron volts), the particle moving at 5 MeV cannot pierce through the field outwardly because it submits to strict Newtonian physical laws. This is a predictable state of calm that can be used and capitalized on.
In several laboratory tests, 5 MeV particles were able to pierce through a 9 MeV electromagnetic field, disrupting classical laws and activating quantum physics where occurrences are no longer under control, and the observer is unable to predict their trajectories. Those with a comprehensive knowledge of quantum laws can capitalize on and use these laws. However, this requires a scientific effort and hardship that only specialists can realize. This is what the United States and China are currently doing by being the sole leaders in producing computers that work according to high-technology quantum physics.
This is precisely what happened to Russian-Ukrainian relations and all Newtonian occurrences and political relations when they shifted to quantum conditions. Only those who understand quantum relations can benefit and capitalize on their knowledge and expertise to deal with such relations. Conversely, occurrences seem to be in a state of disruption for those habituated to classical relations and work within these rules.
Russian leaders were oblivious to this sort of knowledge because of their strong penchant for classical Newtonian relations with Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, and Central Asian countries. This led them to the pitfall of draining their capabilities and military, financial, human, political, and technological resources in the war against Ukraine since 2022.
Russian-Georgian relations departed from its classical pattern since 2003. President Mikheil Saakashvili won the democratic elections against Russia’s ally, Eduard Shevardnadze (the Soviet foreign minister during Mikhail Gorbachev’s term). Georgia divested from its relations with Russia and sought to join NATO and the European Union, which provoked Russia to militarily face Tbilisi and support the secession of the Abkhazia and South Ossetia provinces in 2008. These occurrences have remained unchanged since then, despite parties and figures opposed to President Saakashvili ascending to power. Occurrences within the Georgian-Russian relations remain in a quantum state.
Quantum occurrences peaked in the Russian-Armenian relations during the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2020. Russia disregarded Muslim Shiite Azerbaijan’s victory over Russia’s traditional Christian Orthodox ally. It did not resort to assisting or rescuing Armenia, and it abstained from activating the Collective Security Treaty that requires the participating states to assist any member country in the event of a foreign invasion. Armenia’s prime minister, Nikol Pashinyan, was angered and bewildered by Russia’s abandonment of Armenia.
Russia’s mobilization of the Collective Security Treaty countries to intervene militarily in Kazakhstan in January 2022 confirms the quantum occurrences in relations with its neighboring countries. Russia intervened to quell riots and chaos caused by domestic economic issues unrelated to a foreign invasion, saving Kazakh’s president Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s regime despite Kazakhstan being a Muslim nation. Russia abstained from similarly supporting Armenia in 2020.
Elements of the Classical Condition of the Russia-Ukraine Relations
Russians and Ukrainians are all descendants of Slavic tribes that converted to Orthodox Christianity since the reign of Vladimir I in 988 A.D. A dominant culture and a system of shared values emerged and diffused in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. The Russians shared the Ukrainian people’s religion, denomination, and culture, and they shared their political crises, hardships, and major wars as well. A geopolitical, strategic partnership started with the Mongol invasion of Russia in 1223 A.D. and the defeat of the Russian Army in the Battle of the Kalka River when the city of Vladimir was burned to the ground in 1238 A.D. Later, the Mongolian Golden Horde leader, Batu Khan, raided the city of Kyiv with the help of General Subutai Khan in 1240 A.D. They pillaged and burned Kyiv like they did in Vladimir two years prior. Consequently, a geostrategic partnership started between the Russians and the Ukrainians on classical Newtonian bases, coupled with a rudimentary economic activity.
This continued after the Muscovite Army defeated the Mongol Golden Horde, and the Russians liberated the Grand Principality of Moscow following the second Battle of the Kalka River in 1380 A.D., annexing the Republic of Pskov and the Novgorod Republic to the Vladimir Province, with Moscow as its capital. Russia was established, after which the Russians sought to regain Ukraine from Lithuania, the latter having conquered vast swaths of Ukraine after defeating the Golden Horde army in the Battle of Blue Waters in 1363 A.D.
This geostrategic partnership endured. It was reinforced when the Russians cooperated with the leader of the Cossack Ukrainians, Bohdan Khmelnytsky. They provided him with the financial and military resources he needed to liberate Ukraine from the army of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. They pushed them out of the Eastern bank and forced them out behind the Dnieper River. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was forced to conclude the Treaty of Andrusovo in 1667 A.D., resigning to the control the Russians had over the eastern bank of Ukraine, which includes the Donets Basin and the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and which Russia is fighting to regain today. Russia announced its annexation of the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts in September 2022, considering them Russian soil and under the sovereignty of the Russian state. Current Russian President Putin and his predecessor, Dmitry Medvedev, threatened to use nuclear force to safeguard the unity and integrity of Russia and its sovereignty over its soil, including the new regions it annexed from Ukraine.
Russian leaders do not depart from their tradition of framing Russian-Ukrainian relations using Newtonian features, and they cannot implement them except according to classical foundations and visions. This persisted from the Tsarist reign before and after the Romanovs, during the Soviet rule, and in post-Soviet Russia. Russia considers Ukrainians “little Russians” and Ukraine a geopolitical offshoot that will necessarily join or ally itself with its Russian origins. Ukraine became part of the Russian Empire at the end of the reign of Catherine II in 1795 A.D. after raging wars that Russia fought against the Ottoman Empire, Sweden, Finland, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
This did not change after the Bolshevik coup against Tsarist Russia in 1917. The Soviet Union annexed Ukraine in 1922, four years after the Rada announced the establishment of an independent Ukraine in 1918.
Therefore, the classical understanding of Russian-Ukrainian relations has three bases:
- Geopolitical unity or alliance, i.e., the state of relations in these past centuries: The Russians found it unobjectionable that a Ukrainian led the Soviet Union and Nikita Khrushchev served in critical positions starting in 1953 after the death of Stalin. However, when Khrushchev leaned towards reconfiguring the Soviet Union geopolitically and attempted to impose an unusual Ukrainian hegemony over the Russians, Leonid Brezhnev, Alexei Kosygin, and Nikolai Podgorny revolted and deposed him in 1964.
- Geoeconomic unity or alliance, i.e., the state of relations since the mid-19th century and the start of Tsarist Russia’s manufacturing era: Ukraine, in general, and the Donbas region specifically, became the center of Russian manufacturing, leading the economy because of its vast coal resources until the end of the 19th century.
This persisted through the Soviet era. Manufacturing was centered in the Donbas basin. The Russians built nuclear reactors, uranium enrichment plants, and ballistic missile plants in Ukraine. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Ukraine inherited these huge industrial, military, and civilian resources, along with many nuclear heads and intercontinental ballistic missiles.
When the Ukrainian economy slowed down following the 2008 world economic crisis, commodities and energy prices plummeted, and the Ukrainian trade balance shifted to a deficit. Russia then bailed Ukraine out during the presidency of Viktor Yanukovych, the Ukrainian Party of Regions leader. In 2013, Russia bought $15Bn worth of Ukrainian government bonds at a mere 3% interest over ten years as a lifeline to Ukraine during its economic crisis.
Russia slashed gas prices for Ukraine during the presidency of Russia’s ally because it considered Ukraine a geoeconomic partner. It was also necessary to support Ukraine to prevent it from leaning toward the European Union and the West back then.
- A religious partnership through the Church: The Ukrainian Orthodox Church had been a branch of the Russian Orthodox Church under the auspices of the Moscow Patriarchate in a classical relation since the 17th century. The Ukrainian Church’s loyalty did not change with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the separation of Ukraine in 1992. Despite the establishment of the Kyiv Orthodox Church that stripped the Moscow Patriarchate’s authority, most dioceses and the clergy remained loyal to the Moscow Patriarchate until 2018 when Bartholomew I, Orthodox Ecumenical Patriarch and archbishop of Constantinople, authorized the divestment of the Kyiv Church from Moscow and blessed it, bestowing upon it an official title as will be shown later.
When the relations between Russia and Ukraine departed from the classical Newtonian understandings, Russian leadership under the presidency of Boris Yeltsin (1991-1999) could not realize the quantum shift in Moscow’s relations with Kyiv. Insisting on repudiating the change on the part of the Russian leadership under President Putin has increased since 2004. It led to the eruption of the Orange Revolution, which caused Yushchenko’s ascension to the presidency and his leaning toward the West and the European Union, designing policies and strategies to sever the classical historical relations with Russia.
The repudiation of the shift to quantum relations peaked with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s declaration of war against Ukraine on February 24, 2022. He committed to eradicating Nazi nationalist Ukrainians and trying them for shelling the Donbas region since 2014. He pledged to demilitarize Ukraine and dismantle its military capacities, turning it into a non-aligned, predictable state. He vowed to use all the weaponry and capabilities Russia possesses, including nuclear weapons, to stop whoever impedes the Russian Army from realizing its strategic goals and objectives.
Classically, the Russian Army should have won the war in a matter of weeks in 2022, ousting President Volodymyr Zelensky’s regime from Kyiv, installing a new rule and a government allied with Russia, bringing Ukraine back into the geopolitical partnership with Russia, and expanding exclusive Russian influence to the borders with Poland. However, Russia’s leadership lost hope and faith in a classical strategic victory, annexing Ukraine and restoring Russia’s position as a pole as it was under Soviet rule. As Jimmy Carter’s national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, persistently stated: by annexing Ukraine, Russia is a world empire and an international pole.
It seems as though occurrences are no longer contained and under control, and observers cannot predict what the future will bring.
Whereas quantum analysis leans toward predicting a stunning defeat of the Russian Army and a victory of the Ukrainian Army, leading to the rise of the Ukrainian giant and the Ukrainian-Polish pole in the geopolitical map of Europe, against the wishes of Russia.
The following quantum interpretation will provide a gateway toward understanding the reasons behind the Russian failure in Ukraine.
In the Quantum Condition:
The 5 MeV particle stunned physics experts by piercing through the 9 MeV electromagnetic field and exiting the field in a quantum activity that defies Newtonian laws. This activity is unpredictable, and it is impossible to foresee its movement or anticipate its trajectory before or after the breakthrough. Similarly, Ukraine took a quantum trajectory after the Russian invasion in 2022, showing a resilience that neither the Russians nor the Americans, Europeans, and others could predict in the face of a historically great army that had a record of victories, including triumphing over Napoleon Bonaparte’s army, the German Nazi Army, the Ottoman Army, and others. The Ukrainian Army overpowered strings of Russian tanks that surrounded Kyiv coming close to controlling its essential sovereign institutions, pushing the Russians out in April 2022. Later, the Russian Army was pushed out of Kharkiv, Lyman, and Kherson in the Summer and Fall of 2022. Ukraine showed a skilled and fierce resistance in Mariupol and the Azovstal factory on the Sea of Azov in the Spring and Summer of 2022 using Soviet-era weaponry. The West had abstained from arming Ukraine between 2014 and 2022 out of fear of provoking Russia. Before the Russian invasion, former German Chancellor Angela Merkel insisted on the futility of sending arms to Ukraine, and so did France under the presidency of François Hollande and Macron and the United States until they could see the persistence and courage that the Ukrainian Army showed in their fight against the Russian Army. It was only then that the West provided Ukraine with tactical defense weapons. The West was still hesitant to give Ukraine heavy tanks and armored vehicles until a year after the Russian invasion and stalled with giving it F-16 fighter jets until the end of 2023 and the start of 2024.
Russia could not predict the capabilities of the Ukrainian Army to withstand attacks. Despite their vast human and material resources and expansive knowledge and experience, the US Army and American intelligence agencies could not predict how long the Ukrainian Army would remain unbreakable in the face of the Russians. Americans estimated a 3-7 day resistance, after which Kyiv would fall in the hands of the Russian Army. Joe Biden even offered Ukrainian President Zelensky an American aircraft to transport him out of Ukraine. However, Zelensky refused and asked for weapons, gears, and ammunition instead.
Experienced diplomat and previous Department of State Secretary Henry Kissinger failed to predict the resilience of the Ukrainians, and all the different scenarios he proposed about the development of the war against Ukraine were false and could not be substantiated.
This is only a limited amount of evidence showing all observers’ inability to predict the development of Russia-Ukraine relations, knowing that the remaining evidence is much more extensive, proving a quantum change in the relations between Russia and Ukraine.
The Elements of the Quantum Condition of the Relations Between Russia and Ukraine:
- A geostrategic partnership between Ukraine and Poland after the dissolution of the historical Russian-Ukrainian geopolitical partnership:
Poles are Catholics who follow the Western Church, while Ukrainians and Russians are Orthodox Christians following the Eastern Church. These churches share a long history of wars and bloodshed.
As previously stated, Poland, sometimes on its own and sometimes along with Lithuania, took over Ukraine and Western Russia, seizing Moscow between 1610 and 1612. Russia expelled the Polish Army and concluded a truce agreement with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1619. Russia supported Ukrainians and the Cossacks to liberate and partially free Ukrainian soil. Another area of Ukraine remained under Polish control until the Austro-Hungarian Empire seized Poland and a part of Ukraine in 1795 and until WWI ended in 1918. The Austrian Empire disintegrated, liberating Poland and Ukraine. However, the Germans almost immediately conquered Ukraine in WWII with support from Poland, while the Russians and Ukrainians fought the Nazi German and Polish Armies. However, the Russia-Ukraine geostrategic partnership has turned into hostility and intense enmity. At the same time, the historically contentious Ukrainian-Polish relations shifted into a geostrategic partnership contributing to the rise of the Ukrainian-Polish pole in Europe, constituting a major obstruction in the face of Russian aspirations in Eastern and Central Europe.
Poland declared its resolution to build a 400,000-troop army, the strongest European forces in the NATO alliance. Similarly, Ukraine mobilized one million fighters between soldiers, reservists, and volunteers, aiming to establish a professional army not based on compulsory military service.
When these armies join forces, the largest military power will emerge in Europe, eclipsing those of Germany, France, Britain, and Italy.
Taking into consideration the conditions of the expertise, familiarity, and exposure gained by the Ukrainian Army through all sorts of battles over land, sea, plains, forests, cities, and rural areas, a masterly fighting force is emerging in Europe.
Ukraine might resolve itself to manufacturing nuclear weapons and transcontinental ballistic missiles to secure itself against a future conflict with Russia, especially since the United States and Britain contravened the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 that required Ukraine to surrender its nuclear arsenal in return for the United States and the United Kingdom to defend Ukraine against any Russian offensive. If Ukraine seeks and obtains atomic weapons, coupled with the expertise and capabilities it has accumulated, it will become a great power in Europe. If it also allies itself with Poland, Germany might not acquiesce to such an alliance’s influence over the rest of Europe.
Few quantum occurrences constitute as clear an example as the Ukrainian occurrence in its relations with Russia does.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine aimed to dismantle and disarm the Ukrainian Army, annihilating its nuclear expertise. The opposite happened: Ukraine will become a major military power with atypical capabilities, maybe nuclear, and a fighting experience rare in the rest of Europe.
Consequently, European and other experts now insist on sharing Ukraine’s expertise in defense and partnering with it. A European study in strategy argued that “member-states of the European Union can learn from Ukraine’s experience […]. Ukraine’s response to the Russian invasion holds vital lessons for the rest of Europe. Kyiv has placed cross-society resistance at the heart of its national defense, bringing all military and security agencies under a single command, assisted by support from the civilian population. […] This constitutes a ‘third way’ between the ‘total defence’ model of Sweden, Finland, Singapore, and Switzerland, which brings together military and civilian actors in a whole-of-society approach to security; and the strongly hierarchical model of the United States, Russia, and China[…] This learning should be a two-way street, with Europe delivering arms and training to Ukraine, and in return learning from the Ukrainian experience of building a system of national resilience and defense”.[i] This European text holds evidence of Ukraine’s quantum condition. From a weak country in the face of Russia whose entry to the NATO alliance and membership in the European Union was refused, begging its allies for Abrams, Leopard, and Challenger tanks, Patriot, HIMARS, and Storm Shadow missiles, and F-16 fighter jets to defend itself, Ukraine turned into a strong state asked to share its expertise in the principles of comprehensive national defense. Soon, Ukraine will be asked to take Europeans under its nuclear and missile security umbrella against Russia, China, and Iran.
President Putin wanted protection against the expansion of the military system of NATO to Russia’s borders with Ukraine. It is the reason why he launched his military offensive against Ukraine. Instead, the NATO structure scaled up, arriving at Russia’s borders through Finland (Finland shares a 1300 km long border with Russia) and Sweden joining the alliance in 2024 after two centuries of non-alignment, coupled with the military resources that the Swedish and Finnish Armies bring to the coalition (300,000 Finnish soldiers including reservists) and all the advanced weaponry, gear, and modern military systems.
A Quantum Ecclesiastical Partnership:
Ukraine did not divest from the Eastern Church or depart from Orthodoxy. The Ukrainian Church remained loyal to Bartholomew I, Orthodox Ecumenical Patriarch and archbishop of Constantinople. It did, however, separate from the Russian Orthodox Church and officially broke its allegiance to it in 2018. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church joined it in 2022 as a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and Patriarch Kirill of Moscow blessed the war: “Sacrifice in the course of carrying out your military duty cleanses away all sins,” while describing it as a “fratricidal war.”[ii]
This likely caused the Ukrainian Orthodox Church to allow its parishes to “move its official Christmas holiday to December 25, further distancing itself from the traditions of the Putin-aligned Russian Orthodox Church, which celebrates the holiday on January 7.” [iii] It did not leave Orthodoxy, but it did not join Catholicism either. The quantum relation between Moscow and Kyiv put it in a middle position between the two classical positions.
After the apparent emergence of the Russian President as a protector of Orthodoxy in the world in 2013, the Russia-Ukraine quantum relations led to a deep schism between Russian and Ukrainian Orthodox.
In the Vatican, Pope Francis said: “supplying weapons to Ukraine is morally acceptable for self-defence.” [iv]
Russian President Putin drove occurrences toward the opposite of his objectives. Russia was closer to its goals before the war on Ukraine than 18 months after it started.
A Purely Quantum Economic Relation:
According to classical Newtonian relations, economic relations fail, and trade relations are cut when states declare war against each other.
However, this did not occur, and the Russian oil and gas pipelines kept sending hydrocarbon substances from Russia to Europe through Ukraine using the Druzhba and Nord Stream 1 pipelines and others passing through Ukrainian soil. Despite the raging war between them, Ukraine kept receiving its share of Russian gas daily without interruptions.
Had European countries not decided to cut their need for Russian gas and sever their ties with Russian energy sources, freeing themselves from Russia in the field of energy resources, agreeing to cap the price of Russian crude oil barrel at 60$/barrel, and if it were not for the many sanctions that the West imposed, in concert, over Russian banks and companies, oil and gas pipelines would still be moving these resources to the European Union through Ukraine today, in a baffling quantum relation.
Ukraine also entered an agreement with Russia to transport grains and fertilizers through the Black Sea, sponsored by the United Nations and brokered by Turkey. This agreement was in effect for a whole year before Russia broke it in the Summer of 2023, exiting it and returning to classical characteristics of the relations, where an economic and trade relationship is impossible during a military war.
Classically: Russia should win the war on Ukraine because it is not a war between Russia and the West. Russia wants to justify its failure on the battlefield, claiming that it is fighting NATO. Had Russia actually fought NATO, and after its army’s weaknesses were revealed in this war, NATO would have exterminated the Russian Army classically in a matter of weeks. Instead, it is a Russian-Ukrainian war that Russia is fighting using all its available advanced, traditional weapons such as Iskander M and S missiles, Avangard missiles, Kinzhal hypersonic missiles, Kalibr missiles, the whole range of Sukhoi fighter jets, including 5th generation SU-57, its helicopters, including K-52 Alligator, and did not leave a type of weapon or ammunition unused. Ammunition shortages led it to ask Iran and North Korea for a supply of UAVs and heavy artillery ammunition. It also put into action the pride of its manufacturing, the T-14 Armada Russian tanks.
On the other hand, Ukraine is fighting with what Western countries provide it with: weapons whose range cannot reach the Russian interior for fear of provoking nuclear Russia.
Classically: Russia should be on the offensive, realizing crushing victories, with Ukraine defending its cities and rural areas.
Quantically: Ukraine will prevail in this war and cut the Russian military supply chain on several fronts, pushing Russia out of many cities and strategic positions it had occupied at the beginning of the war, defeating the traditional Russian armed forces.
Quantically: Ukraine will keep developing its offensive until it reaches the international borders separating the two countries, while Russia will continue defending its positions in Eastern Ukraine.
With what preceded, we laid the foundations for a new approach to scientific political analysis, establishing a new school of quantum political analysis, having expanded on and provided the evidence for the Newtonian and quantum relations between Russia and Ukraine.
[i] “Defend. Resist. Repeat: Ukraine’s lessons for European defence,” Hanna Shelest, Policy brief, 9 November 2022. The European Council on Foreign Relations. https://ecfr.eu/publication/defend-resist-repeat-ukraines-lessons-for-european-defence/
[ii] https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/09/25/7369023/
[iii] https://edition.cnn.com/2023/07/29/europe/ukraine-christmas-date-change-intl/index.html
[iv] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/pope-says-supplying-weapons-ukraine-is-morally-acceptable-self-defence-2022-09-15/